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Abstract: This paper seeks to examine the outlook of the Serbian Minister in London, 
Mateja Mata Bošković, during the first half of the Great War on the South Slav (Yugoslav) 
question – a unification of all the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in a single state, which was 
Serbia’s war aim. He found himself in close contact with the members of the Yugoslav 
Committee, an organisation of the irredentist Yugoslav émigrés from Austria-Hungary 
in which two Croat politicians, Frano Supilo and Ante Trumbić, were leading figures. In 
stark contrast to other Serbian diplomats, Bošković was not enthusiastic about Yugoslav 
unification. He suspected the Croat émigrés, especially Supilo, of pursuing exclusive 
Croat interests under the ruse of the Yugoslav programme. His dealings with them were 
made more difficult on account of the siding of a group of British “friends of Serbia”, the 
most prominent of which were Robert William Seton-Watson and Henry Wickham 
Steed, with the Croat émigrés. Though not opposed in principle to an integral Yugoslav 
unification, Bošković preferred staunch defence of Serbian Macedonia from Bulgarian 
ambitions and the acquisition of Serb-populated provinces in southern Hungary, while 
in the west he seems to have been content with the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
part of Slavonia and an outlet to the Adriatic Sea in Dalmatia. Finally, the reception of 
and reaction to Bošković’s reports on the part of the Serbian Prime Minister, Nikola Pašić, 
clearly shows that the latter was determined to persist in his Yugoslav policy, despite the 
Treaty of London which assigned large parts of the Slovene and Croat lands to Italy and 
made the creation of Yugoslavia an unlikely proposition. In other words, Pašić did not 
vacillate between the “small” and the “large programme”, between Yugoslavia and Greater 
Serbia, as it has been often alleged in historiography and public discourse. 
Keywords: Mateja Mata Bošković, Yugoslav Committee, Serbia, Yugoslavia, Nikola Pašić, 
British (English) friends of Serbia, R. W. Seton-Watson, First World War 
Since the outbreak of the Great War the Serbian government set itself on the course of creating a large South Slav (Yugoslav) state which would unite all 









Austria-Hungary and Serbia that Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, Nikola 
Pašić, discussed in an inner circle the envisaged territorial scope of a state which 
would be formed after the successful conclusion of the war.1 But it was not before 
7 December 1914, during a critical phase of the Austro-Hungarian offensive, 
that the Serbian parliament declared urbi et orbi in the wartime capital Niš that a 
Yugoslav unification was Serbia’s war aim.2 This was a bold step as its realization 
practically presumed the disappearance of Austria-Hungary from the political 
map of Europe. For that, apart from the requirements of military situation, there 
was no political will whatsoever among the Entente Powers. The pursuit of Pašić’s 
Yugoslav policy during the war has been a subject of much historiographical 
interest and controversy, as will be discussed later. The purpose of this essay is to 
contribute to the debate on that thorny question and, more broadly, on the run-
up to the creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (Yugoslavia) by 
focusing on three important and intertwined themes. The first one concerns the 
views and activities of the Serbian Minister in London after November 1913, 
Mateja Mata Bošković, which have been neglected so far by historians despite 
being of considerable interest in and of themselves. The second related theme 
is an exploration of insights into Pašić’s Yugoslav policy from the perspective 
of his reception of and reaction to Bošković’s reports, which cast doubts on the 
intentions and conduct of the Croat politicians who worked with the Serbian 
government for the formation of a Yugoslavia. Finally, the third theme covers the 
influence of a group of “British friends of Serbia”, distinguished individuals and 
high profile public people, who propagated the Yugoslav idea and campaigned 
to associate the British government with the Yugoslav cause. Apart from their 
efforts in the press and what might be termed public sphere, which have been 
discussed elsewhere,3 they tried to impress their views on policy-makers largely 
by means of “the various memoranda and letters and reports which some of us 
fired off at the F[oreign] O[ffice]”,4 as well as through personal contacts they 
made with government officials. But this paper looks specifically at the ways in 
which these people affected the work of important Yugoslav émigrés in Britain 
1 Panta Draškić, Moji memoari, ed. Dušan T. Bataković (Belgrade: Srpska književna zadruga, 
1990), 87. 
2 Dragoslav Janković, “Niška deklaracija (nastajanje programa jugoslovenskog ujedinjenja u 
Srbiji 1914. godine)”, Istorija XX veka X (1969), 7–111. 
3 Harry Hanak, Great Britain and Austria-Hungary during the First World War: A Study in 
the Formation of Public Opinion (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962). 
4 Arthur J. May, “Seton-Watson and the Treaty of London”, The Journal of Modern History 
29/1 (Mar. 1957), 42; see also Kenneth Calder, Britain and the Origins of the New Europe, 
1914–1918 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976); Hugh and Christopher Seton-
Watson, The Making of a New Europe: R. W. Seton-Watson and the Last Years of Austria-
Hungary (London: Methuen, 1981). 
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and their relations with Bošković and, by implication, the Serbian government, 
which is another facet which has not been a subject of a sustained analysis.
Bošković was a diplomat who had been closely involved in Serbia’s 
political and military successes in the two Balkan Wars of 1912-1913.5 As part 
of his six years as Minister in Athens, he had participated in the diplomatic 
preliminaries leading to the conclusion of the Balkan Alliance between Serbia, 
Bulgaria, Greece and Montenegro which had defeated the Ottoman Empire and 
ousted it from most of its Balkan territory. He had then negotiated with the 
Greek Prime Minister, Eleftherios Venizelos, and contributed to the making of 
the Serbo-Greek defensive treaty of 1 June 1913 which had prepared the ground 
for a victorious war against Bulgaria arising out of a conflict over the distribution 
of Ottoman territory. Bošković also proved his abilities in London during the 
July crisis: he sensed an imminent danger for Serbia and sent a clear warning to 
Pašić in marked contrast to the uncertainty of the Serbian Minister in Vienna, 
Jovan Jovanović nicknamed Pižon.6
Bošković made it clear to the Serbian Foreign Ministry (MID) that the 
prevailing opinion in the Foreign Office was that the maintenance of Austria-
Hungary, perhaps with somewhat reduced territory, constituted a necessity 
for European balance of power. Since such conviction ran contrary to Serbian 
interests, he decided to work through prominent British publicists in order to 
create a faction in public opinion favourable to the idea of the demise of the 
Habsburg Monarchy and formation of nation-states in its place, which would 
in turn affect the government policy.7 The Minister also realised that the 
sympathetic British attitude towards Italy and Hungary, along with the mistrust 
for the Slavs, would cause much difficulties in respect to territorial settlement 
for Istria, Dalmatia and potential Hungary’s access to sea in Fiume (Rijeka). 
It was exactly those musings that led Pašić to propose the urgent formation 
of a Yugoslav committee in London which would represent all the Yugoslav 
5 For an account of Bošković’s career, see forthcoming Dragan Bakić, “Mateja Mata Bošković: 
prilog za biografiju srpskog diplomate”, in Ljubodrag Ristić, ed., Srbija 1918: oslobodjenje 
domovine, povratak ratnika, život u novoj državi (Čačak, Belgrade , Ljubljana: Medjuopštinki 
istorijski arhiv Čačak, Centar za istoriju Jugoslavije i savremenu nacionalnu istoriju, ZRC 
SAZU – Inštitut za kulturne in memorialne studije, 2019). 
6 Ibid. 
7 Arhiv Jugoslavije (AJ) [Archives of Yugoslavia], Jovan Jovanović‒Pižon Papers [collection 
no. 80], 80-2-10, Bošković to MID, 6 September 1914, no. 186. Dates in the archival 
documents and diaries are given according to the old style ( Julian calendar), which was in 
official use in Serbia until 1919, unless that was not the case in the original text. In the main 
text of the article, dates are always given according to the new style (Gregorian calendar). The 
difference between the two is 13 days (6 September is 19 September according to the new 
style). 
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provinces and make propaganda in British and European public opinion.8 What 
Pašić had in mind was to transform a group of Yugoslav émigrés gathered in still 
neutral Italy into a more formal organisation. It all started with three Dalmatian 
politicians, Frano Supilo, Ante Trumbić and Remiggio Gazzari, who arrived 
in Venice after the outbreak of war and discussed what to do on a daily basis, 
largely animated by their fear of Italian agitation and pretensions on their native 
province. They were soon joined by other émigrés, among them a well-known 
sculptor, Ivan Meštrović, another Dalmatian who lived in Rome at the time. As 
it soon became apparent, Supilo, Trumbić and Meštrović were the three most 
prominent and important Croat figures. Their political campaign commenced 
in Rome where lively diplomatic activities were taking place and where they 
were met most cordially in the Serbian Legation by Charge d’Affaires, Ljubomir 
Mihailović (there was no appointed Minister at the time). It was Mihailović 
who introduced the Croat émigrés to the world of high politics: he arranged 
for their audiences with the French, Russian and British Ambassadors whom 
they apprised of the Yugoslav ethnic claim on Dalmatia and the desire of 
their compatriots to unite with Serbia. There were also plans for propaganda 
activities, namely publishing a brochure on the Yugoslav question and launching 
a French language journal in Switzerland. The émigrés appreciated themselves a 
need for organisation and, independently of Pašić, considered the possibility of 
forming an irredentist committee which would be joined by a number of people 
fleeing from Austria-Hungary. Nevertheless, the initiative rested with Pašić. He 
convened a private meeting in Niš during which he laid down his ideas and sent 
two Serbs from Bosnia-Herzegovina, Nikola Stojanović and Dušan Vasiljević, 
to work with the “Yugoslavs” and be a mouthpiece of the views and intentions 
of the Serbian government, and decided to provide financial support without 
which the work, and the sustenance, of many émigrés would not be possible. 
These were the origins of an organisation that would later become known as the 
Yugoslav Committee.9
8 AJ, 80-2-10, two telegrams from Bošković to MID on 23 September 1914 and Pašić’s note, 
12 October 1914; Nikola Stojanović, Jugoslovenski odbor (članci i dokumenti) (Zagreb: Nova 
Evropa, 1927), 10–11. 
9 AJ, 80-21-106, Remiggio Gazzari to Jovan Jovanović, private, Rome, 10 January 1915; 
Dragovan Šepić, “Iz korespodencije Frana Supila”, Arhivski vjesnik I/1 (1958), 252–254, 262–
264; Dragovan Šepić, “Trumbićev ‘Dnevnik’”, Historijski pregled V (1959), 167–175. The most 
exhaustive work on the Yugoslav Committee remains that of the Czech historian Milada 
Paulova, Jugoslavenski odbor u Londonu: povijest jugoslavenske emigracije za svjetskog rata od 
1914–1918 (Zagreb: Prosvjetna nakladna zadruga, 1925). However, this work is not impartial 
to conflicts that emerged during the war between the Croat émigrés and Pašić. This has much 
to do with the fact that Paulova’s most important source of information was the conversations 
she had with the members of the Yugoslav Committee after the war, mostly with its president 
Ante Trumbić. Moreover, Paulova even sent some chapters of her book to Trumbić to read 
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While the realisation of the Yugoslav programme was a matter of a more 
long-term perspective, Serbia faced a tangible danger that neutral Bulgaria 
might attack her from the rear tempted by an opportunity to snatch Macedonia. 
The Entente diplomacy made efforts to win over Bulgaria to enter into war on 
its side, for which Serbia was supposed to pay the price by ceding to Sofia at 
least part of her own territory in Macedonia ‒ the diplomatic representatives of 
the Entente Powers sounded the Serbian government in this respect since the 
outbreak of war. Bošković believed that Bulgaria would not dare to attack Serbia 
if St. Petersburg made it clear that it would consider any such action an attack 
on Russia herself and if Greece was prepared to honour its commitment in 
accordance with the Greco-Serbian alliance treaty of 1913. On the other side, the 
Minister was certain that no assistance could be expected from Bulgaria against 
Austria-Hungary regardless of potential Serbian concessions in Macedonia. For 
that reason, he recommended, in case it was deemed necessary to make some 
concessions to Sofia, that those should be made only “in agreement with Greece 
and Romania and in proportion to concessions the latter two [countries] are 
willing to make to Bulgaria.”10 The Serbian government found that Athens was 
obliged to provide military assistance if Bulgaria invaded Serbia and because of 
them before publication. As she explained to the renowned Serbian geographer, Jovan Cvijić, 
Paulova believed that because of her conversations with the participants she “understood and 
was able to include in the book some of that spirit, which has gone today, and which others, 
under the impression of the present, cannot any longer and will not reproduce, like I have. 
In time others can also cover the facts ‒ but they will hardly be able to do this.” Even more 
importantly, Paulova was biased as she had neither the wish nor professional inclination to 
try to understand the standpoint of Pašić in his dispute with the Croat émigrés. She had no 
qualms about admitting that “the policy of Mr Pašić has not warmed me up in the slightest, 
and I have turned against it. For the sake of ‘Yugoslavism!’” (Arhiv Srpske Akademije nauka 
i umetnosti (ASANU) [Archives of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts], Papers of 
Jovan Cvijić [collection no. 13484], 13484/946-2, Milada Paulova to Jovan Cvijić, 25 April 
1923). Paulova thus accepted the stereotype imposed by Croat politicians, the members 
of the Yugoslav Committee ‒ which would later be replicated uncritically in communist 
Yugoslav historiography ‒ to the effect that Pašić’s views in the matter of Yugoslav unification 
were exclusively (Greater) Serbian, whereas the Yugoslav émigrés, including the leading 
Croats, allegedly had a truly Yugoslav outlook. Other relevant works include Vaso Bogdanov, 
Ferdo Čulinović and Marko Kostrenčić, Jugoslavenski odbor u Londonu: u povodu 50-godišnjice 
osnivanja (Zagreb: JAZU, 1966); Gale Stokes, “The Role of the Yugoslav Committee in the 
Formation of Yugoslavia”, in Dimitrije Djordjević, ed., The Creation of Yugoslavia 1914–1918 
(California: Clio Books, 1980), 51–71; Milorad Ekmečić, Ratni ciljevi Srbije 1914, 2nd ed. 
(Belgrade: Prosveta, 1990), 302–348; Djordje Stanković, Nikola Pašić i jugoslovensko pitanje, 
2 vols (Belgrade: BIGZ, 1985), II, 11–38; Connie Robinson, “Yugoslavism in the Early 
Twentieth Century: The Politics of the Yugoslav Committee”, in Dejan Djokić and James 
Ker-Lindsey, eds, New Perspectives on Yugoslavia: Key Issues and Controversies (London and 
New York: Routledge, 2010), 10–26. 
10 AJ, 80-7-40, Bošković to Pašić, 8 September 1914, conf. no. 433.  
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that they were all the more concerned by the Greek government’s interpretation 
to the effect that such obligation was non-existent in a situation in which the 
other side took part in a European-scale conflict. Having been one of the key 
participants in the conclusion of the Serbo-Greek treaty, Bošković stressed in 
early 1915 that such interpretation was “inaccurate and contrary to the text 
and spirit of the treaty, which has been concluded for general defence against 
external attacks no matter from which direction they might come, with the 
singe exception [contained] in the attached declaration on Albania. And that 
specifically envisaged exception proves that casus foederis exists in all other 
cases.”11 More importantly, the intransigent attitude in the Macedonian question 
was, in view of the Minister, crucial to pre-empting the pressure on the part 
of the Entente Powers, which could otherwise reach a decision unfavourable 
to Serbia. The objective of Serbian diplomacy, as he saw it, was “to force [their 
hand] rather than expect and hope for a voluntary recognition of what is our 
right and national requirement of the highest order in Macedonia.”12
In the meantime, efforts were made to ensure a benevolent attitude of the 
British press and public opinion in both Yugoslav and Macedonian matter with 
a view to influencing official circles. In this respect, Bošković mostly affected the 
coverage of these affairs in the press through paid services of Crawfurd Price, 
the Times correspondent from Greece, whom he had come to know personally 
during the Second Balkan War against Bulgaria.13 In propaganda, Bošković had 
major assistance from a group of noted scholars which the Serbian government 
sent to London, especially from the spring and summer of 1915 onwards. The 
most prominent of these were Jovan Cvijić, brothers Pavle and Bogdan Popović, 
literary critics, father Nikolaj Velimirović, a well-known Orthodox theologian, 
and the geologist Jovan Žujović.14 They worked tirelessly to win over British 
sympathies for Serbia by getting in touch with a number of persons from the 
press and public sphere, and also by making contact with the Foreign Office 
11 AJ, 80-8-41, Bošković to Pašić, 30 December 1914, conf. no. 587; also Arhiv Srbije (AS) 
[Archives of Serbia], Ministry for Foreign Affairs ‒ Political Department [MID-PO], 1915, 
f[ascicle]. XXVIII, d[ossier]. IV, Bošković to Pašić, 8 October 1915, conf. no. 993. 
12 AJ, 80-8-41, Bošković to Pašić, 11 January 1915, conf. no. 40.
13 AJ, 80-2-10, Bošković’s telegrams to MID on 27 December 1914, no. 579; 3 March 1915, 
no. 259; 11 March 1915, without number; 4 May 1915, no. 508; 80-8-41, Bošković to MID, 
22 July 1915, without number; AS, MID-PO, f. XXVIII, d. IX, Bošković to MID, 20 
November 1915, no. 1160; f. VI, d. VI, Bogdan Popović to Pašić, 9 March 1916.   
14 Ljubinka Trgovčević, “Politička delatnost Jovana Cvijića u Londonu 1915. godine”, Istorijski 
časopis XX (1973), 385–396; Ljubinka Trgovčević, Naučnici Srbije i stvaranje Jugoslavije 
(Belgrade: Narodna knjiga, 1986), 163–176; Dragoslav Janković, “Profesor Pavle Popović i 
jugoslovensko pitanje u Prvom svetskom ratu”, Letopis Matice srpske 416/3 (1975), 219–233; 
Slobodan G. Markovich, “Activities of Father Nikolai Velimirovich in Great Britain during 
the Great War,” Balcanica XLVIII (2017), 143–190. 
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officials. They also carefully observed propaganda activities of the influential 
Bulgarophiles in Britain, particularly those gathered in the Balkan Committee, 
something of a pressure group in which two brothers and Liberal members 
of parliament, Noel and Charles Buxton, were instrumental. But despite this 
strong pro-Bulgarian current among chiefly liberal politicians, Bošković was 
not too much concerned about its impact. As he pointed out to Pašić, Serbia’s 
importance as a military factor was too valuable for official Britain to allow for 
resorting to measures that might weaken her for the benefit of Bulgaria.15 He 
believed, however, that schemes about dispatching Anglo-French troops to 
Serbian Macedonia in connection with the negotiations about the Greek army’s 
entry into war and support for Serbia were potentially dangerous, because their 
presence there would, so the British Bulgarophiles wished, facilitate granting 
territorial concessions to Bulgaria. Bošković thus underscored to Pašić that the 
only meaningful military assistance to Serbia was that provided on the main 
northern front against the Austro-Hungarians, while “we can easily defend 
ourselves the Macedonian parts and I think that we should not accept foreign 
assistance there from anyone and not even from Greece.”16
As for realisation of the Yugoslav programme, and consequently 
cooperation between the Serbian government and Croat émigrés, the foremost 
difficulty concerned the very possibility that wartime combinations of the great 
powers would allow for the formation of a single Yugoslav state. Supilo learned 
in Rome from Charles Loiseau, the French press attaché, about the idea of an 
independent Croatia which would encompass Dalmatia, the Slovene lands 
and part of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Mihailović received confirmation of this 
information from the counsellor of the French Embassy in Rome, who also 
assured him that Serbia would, in such a case, be granted an outlet to sea next to 
the Greek coast or perhaps even as far up as the town of Split, an arrangement to 
which Italy would consent.17 Indeed, reports to that effect had already reached 
the Serbian government from other sources.18 Niš deplored an arrangement 
along these lines as it was designed to thwart a Yugoslav unification, Serbia’s 
proclaimed war aim. The Croat émigrés viewed such a possibility from the 
standpoint of saving Dalmatia from annexation to Italy which was, to their mind, 
a worse outcome than remaining within Austria-Hungary. It would tear apart 
15 AJ, 80-8-41, Bošković to MID, 12 March 1915 (new style), conf. no. 240.
16 AJ, 80-8-41, Bošković to Pašić, 2/15 March 1915, conf. no. 255; also AS, MID-PO, 1915, 
f. XI, d. VIII, Bošković to MID, 20 September 1915, no. 965.   
17 Dragovan Šepić, “Srpska vlada i počeci Jugoslavenskog odbora”, Historijski zbornik XIII/1-
4 (1960), 7; see also from the same author “Supilo u emigraciji: prvi dio studije o radu Frana 
Supila u emigraciji (srpanj 1914. – lipanj 1915)”, Jadranski zbornik: prilozi za povijest Istre, 
Rijeke i Hrvatskog primorja I (1956), 48–50. 
18 Ekmečić, Ratni ciljevi Srbije, 309–310. 
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the lands populated by Croats and expose the Croat population annexed to Italy 
to a great danger of assimilation which was non-existent in the multinational 
Habsburg Empire. For Supilo, the only feasible solution was the creation of a 
Yugoslavia and he thus rejected out of hand the notion of a separate Roman 
Catholic, Slovene-Croat state. Trumbić and Meštrović were not, however, 
disinclined to the idea, since they thought that a Yugoslav state might be 
impossible of achievement, if the Serbian government were not prepared to go 
to any length and the Entente Powers refused it out of consideration for Italy.19 
But Supilo was so determined that they did not contradict him; he remained 
a moving spirit for some time to come. Besides, his policy was no doubt the 
most rational one for the Croats: if Italy took over the most important points 
in Dalmatia and Serbia gained a stretch of the Dalmatian coast, then Croatia 
would become “a victim”, as Trumbić later put it.20 On other occasion, Trumbić 
concluded that Italian possession of the western Istria, together with Hungary’s 
likely access to sea in Fiume, meant that the war would result in the creation 
of a “Greater Serbia, along with the content Hungary and Italy”.21 The rest of 
territory left to constitute a Croat state would serve only as a tool for sparking 
constant conflicts among the South Slavs; because of that the Croat émigrés 
did not want such an independent state to come into being. In the words of 
Supilo, that was “the danger of an independent Croatia with a mission to be a 
splitting wedge and a bone of contention, which would be easy to accomplish 
with the sacrifice of Dalmatia, Istria.”22 It was clear then that Yugoslavia offered 
the best possibilities for safeguarding exclusive Croat interests, namely holding 
together all the territory which the Croats considered their own, and that any 
other policy could have been pursued only out of necessity.
Supilo headed to France and Great Britain to lobby against Italian 
imperialism and for unification of the Croats and Slovenes with Serbia. Just like 
Mihailović in Rome, the Serbian Minister in Paris, Milenko Vesnić, extended 
him a warm welcome upon his arrival in mid-September 1914 and arranged 
for Supilo’s audience with the Russian Ambassador, Alexander Izvolsky, and 
the French Foreign Minister, Théophile Delcassé.23 Just like Mihailović, Vesnić 
praised Supilo’s efforts for the cause of “general national work” and he provided 
him, along with Izvolsky and Delcassé, with a letter of recommendation for 
his further journey to Britain in October. In retrospect, he was convinced that 
“this smart-looking patriot” had left “a very good impression” in both Paris 
19 Šepić, “Trumbićev ‘Dnevnik’”, Rome, 1. X. 1914, 176–177. 
20 Šepić, “Iz korespodencije Frana Supila”, Trumbić to Supilo, Rome, 27. XI. 1914, 276–277. 
21 Ibid., Trumbić to Supilo, Rome, 29. I. and 4. II. 1915, 353–357; see also Šepić, “Trumbićev 
‘Dnevnik’”, Rome, 9. II. 1915, 188.  
22 Šepić, “Iz korespodencije Frana Supila”, Trumbić to Supilo, Athens, 28. V. 1915, 363–367. 
23 AJ, 80-2-9, Milenko Vesnić to Jovan Jovanović‒Pižon, 21 September 1914.
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and London.24 During his mission in Britain, Supilo got in touch with the 
Serbian Legation in London. His relations with the Serbian representative 
there appeared to be different from those in Italy and France: “The Serbian 
Minister, Mr Bošković, who has received me most kindly, does not take me 
anywhere or introduce me at my specific request; rather I make my way among 
Englishmen on my own as a Croat, a Catholic and a shoreman.”25 This was part 
of a tactical approach approved by Serbian Minister and Russian Ambassador, 
Alexander Benckendorff, for the purpose of stressing the home-grown nature 
of the South Slavs’ aspirations and avoiding any involvement with official 
Serbian and Russian policies bound to cause weariness in the Russophobe and 
Slavophobe British environment. But it was Supilo’s second visit to London in 
January 1915 that was more successful in establishing contact with the British 
government. With Bošković standing aside, it was two prominent Britons, 
Robert William Seton-Watson, a Scottish historian and renowned expert on 
south-eastern Europe, and Henry Wickham Steed, foreign editor of the Times, 
with whom Supilo had been acquainted long before the war, who were central to 
his success. In particular, Steed introduced Supilo to Prime Minister, Herbert 
Henry Asquith, and Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey.26 Despite these 
opportunities to advocate the Yugoslav cause, the impression was that Britain 
was least receptive of all the Allies to the prospect of a Yugoslav unification, 
resembling “a dangerous stepmother” as the Croat émigré put it.27 Aside from 
his conversations, Supilo was interested in the preparations for Meštrović’s 
exhibition which was eagerly awaited as an excellent opportunity for Yugoslav 
propaganda. Supilo asked Bošković ‒ acting “For the Yugoslav Committee of 
A[stro].-H[ungarian]. Émigrés”, still not formally constituted ‒ for financial 
support to Dimitrije Mitrinović, an avant-garde man of literature, “on account 
of his involvement with Meštrović’s exhibition in London”. After having been 
informed of this request, Pašić approved.28
Difficult as it was, Serbia’s situation became more complicated because 
of the intertwinement of the Yugoslav and Macedonian questions. The Entente 
Powers argued in Niš that Serbia should cede to Bulgaria at least that part of 
Macedonia which had been a contested zone prior to the Balkan Wars and 
the possession of which had been left for arbitration of the Russian Emperor 
24 AJ, 80-2-9, Vesnić to Pašić, Bordeaux, 4 November 1914. 
25 Dragovan Šepić, ed., Pisma i memorandumi Frana Supila (Belgrade: Naučno delo, 1967), 
doc. 6, Frano Supilo to Nikola Pašić, London, 21. X. 1914, 8–13. 
26 Šepić, “Trumbićev ‘Dnevnik’”, Rome, 25. I. 1915, 184. 
27 Šepić, Pisma i memorandumi Frana Supila, doc. 17, Supilo to Dušan Vasiljević, London, 3. 
I. 1915, 37–39.  
28 AS, MID, Legation London [PsL], f. 1, pov r 649/1915, Bošković to Pašić, 8-I-1915, conf. 
no. 31; Pašić to Bošković, 13/26-I-1915, conf. no. 347. 
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according to the 1912 alliance treaty between the two countries. In return, 
the Entente Powers offered Serbia concessions in the west at the expense of 
the Habsburg Monarchy, the minimum of which was an outright annexation 
of Bosnia-Herzegovina and an outlet to the Adriatic Sea after the successful 
conclusion of the war. In doing so, and without consulting the Serbian 
government in advance, they proposed a settlement on the basis of a territorial 
bargain which would, in their view, satisfy the essential Serbian requirements. 
None of the Entente Powers was interested in, or took seriously an integral 
Yugoslav unification. Pašić and the Serbian government were averse to accepting 
such an offer, but despite their protests and reservations they could hardly reject 
out of hand what was, after all, a unanimous demand of their allies. The Croat 
émigrés, on the other side, hoped that Serbia would be willing to renounce 
Macedonia in order to have the western Yugoslav provinces, above all Dalmatia, 
included in a future Yugoslav state rather than have them become an object of 
compensation in the transactions made by Entente Powers, mostly to meet 
Italy’s requests. Although they could not, for obvious reasons, state openly their 
opinion to the Serbs, the latter were familiar with their attitude. “Trumbić once 
[…] very angry: let the Serbs cede Macedonia, just as long as Dalmatia is saved; 
Dalmatia is the main [thing]”, Pavle Popović found out.29
The information on the Croat émigrés’ utterances to the effect that 
Macedonia was of secondary importance to Serbia in relation to the western 
parts and that concessions could be given to Bulgaria in that province reached 
Bošković, as well as Cvijić and Pavle Popović, and caused his aversion to their 
activities. Bošković asked of Pašić himself to draw attention of the émigrés to 
the necessity of not making such statements, with which the Prime Minister 
agreed and issued instructions in that sense.30 But the warnings had no effect 
and Bošković, just like Cvijić, came to think that the émigrés should best be 
removed from London and prevented from causing damage, and that they 
should be directed to organise an armed resistance to Italian pretensions in their 
own native provinces: 
29 Pavle Popović, Iz dnevnika, ed. by Bogdan Lj. Popović (Belgrade: Zavod za udžbenike, 
2001), 11 June 1915, 186. Some ten months later, Supilo had no qualms about lecturing 
Pašić himself how Serbia which had “already solemnly renounced Macedonia” according to 
the 1912 agreement with Bulgaria, as he interpreted it, would now have “to make all possible 
compromises in order better and more solidly to resolve the great Yugoslav question” (AS, 
MID, PsL, f. I, pov r 831/1916, Supilo [Rome Legation] to Pašić, 3 April 1916, no. 495; 
Dragovan Šepić, Supilo diplomat: rad Frana Supila u emigraciji 1914–1917. godine (Zagreb: 
Naprijed, 1961), 183). With the fall of Serbia in late 1915, Supilo clearly thought that such 
advice to the exiled Serbian government would not be considered outrageous. 
30 AJ, 80-2-10, Bošković to MID, 17 March 1915, no. 310 and Pašić’s note on the back, 18 
March 1915. 
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Therefore, I share Cvijić’s opinion that revolutionary work should commence 
and that Yugoslav leaders should be engaged with it, so that the people are 
prepared to resist Italian occupation, which would no doubt provide the best 
document [sic] for settling the question to our benefit. Presence and work of 
the Yugoslav émigrés there for the purpose of preparing a national movement 
for unification with Serbia could be much more useful that their staying here 
where the official circles are very well, and the public fairly, informed about the 
ethnographic situation in Dalmatia and Istria, and where the Yugoslav émigrés 
could be detrimental to [our] work for Serbia relating to the Macedonian 
question which is more difficult and important for us, because of their lack of 
understanding and depreciation of the Serbian state’s interests in the central 
area of the Balkan peninsula. Supilo has good connections here, but he has 
already done [what he could] and gave all information where necessary, so I 
think he would also be more useful there in preparing the real reasons which 
could dispose favourably our allies for whom the most beautiful sheer words 
will hardly have that persuasive power that lies in a lively action. The solution 
of the western question cannot depend on settling relations with Bulgaria in 
Macedonia, because the factors of these questions are different and without 
mutual connection. These are two completely separate matters. […] Thus it 
should not be thought that we will have more success in the west if we are giving 
way in Macedonia. We will succeed in the west insofar as Italy and the Triple 
Alliance feel a danger from further difficulties and conflicts on that side, in 
case injustice is done to the Yugoslavs, and not if they make concessions to the 
Bulgarians. Our Yugoslav brethren do not understand that and, wishing to have 
as much success in the west as possible, they are willing unconsciously to harm 
Serbia’s great interests in Macedonia. Thus I find that they should be directed to 
work energetically for [the benefit of ] their own parts and let us take care about 
preserving Serbia’s rights in Macedonia for which prospects are quite good.31
In parallel with the Yugoslav question and the pressure exerted on her to 
make concessions in Macedonia, Serbia had to deal with another threat: there 
was a possibility that her allies might promise to Romania the entire province 
of the Banat in the course of secret negotiations with Bucharest to induce that 
country to join them in the war. Part of the Banat was populated by Serbs and 
obtaining it was envisaged as part of Serbia’s war aims. To justify their conduct, 
the allies not only invoked the necessities of warfare, but also presented Serbia’s 
sacrifice of the Banat as a reasonable concession which would be compensated 
in the western provinces. After having heard all Bošković’s appeals that the allies 
should not make any decisions on Serbia’s northern borders without consulting 
the Serbian government, the delivery of a memoir concerning the Banat and 
delimitation with Romania (a map made by Cvijić was attached to the memoir 
with the Serbian proposal for the Romanian border), Grey explicitly warned 
the Serbian Minister “that it would not be wise perhaps not to acquire Bosnia 
31 AJ, 80-2-10, Bošković (and Cvijić) to Pašić, 4 April 1915, no. 387; also Bošković to Pašić, 
15 April 1915, no. 430.
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and [an outlet to] sea in case we do not succeed to beat the enemy.”32 Bošković 
recommended to Pašić that no effort should be spared to defend Serbian interests 
in St. Petersburg where negotiations with the Romanians were taking place. 
Anticipating that the allies would request from Serbia to assist the Italian and 
Romanian armies once they had started their operations, the Minister argued 
that should be refused without territorial compensations, making the most of 
the situation and redressing the border settlement with both countries. Cvijić 
appears to have spoken on his behalf as well when he advised that it was better 
to mark time and have a free hand at a decisive moment to settle matters in the 
field than to indulge in futile protests: “Do not make a fuss. Let us deal kindly 
with Italy, but in such manner as not to assume any commitment. In due course, 
when the General Staff considers it opportune, undertake a military action, but 
in Croatia rather than in Bosnia.”33
Bošković believed that once the matter of Serbian-Romanian border had 
been settled the Entente Powers would increase their pressure on Serbia to make 
concessions to Bulgaria in Macedonia. In that case, Bošković suggested to Pašić 
to adopt a determined stance towards the allies. In his view, any Serbian weakness 
and conciliatoriness might encourage the allies to reach a unilateral solution and 
present Serbia with a fait accompli. “However, if we are resolved to defend the 
territory of our state from Bulgaria even by force of arms, I am firmly convinced,” 
Bošković wrote, “that we have already and finally won that game because the 
powers of the Triple Alliance, our allies, cannot in any case use physical force 
against Serbia, and they will not want to cause a fresh catastrophe in the Balkans 
in order to satisfy Bulgaria.”34 Aside from that, the Minister recommended that 
Serbia cling to her alliance agreement with Greece, to the conclusion of which 
he had contributed considerably, in case of a Bulgarian attack. “Feeling that the 
critical moment is fast-approaching, I consider it my duty, just like I have done 
on several occasions before, in the face of dangers threatening Serbia, especially 
prior to the war against Bulgaria and last summer prior to Austria-Hungary’s 
preparations to attack Serbia, to present my opinion to you in this extremely 
important matter and to ask of you to pay attention to it.”35
32 AJ, 80-2-10, Bošković’s telegrams to Pašić on 22 April 1915, no. 450; 24 April 1915, no. 
479; 9 May 1915, no. 521 [quoted]; 29 June 1915, without number. 
33 Andrija Lainovic, “Misija Jovana Cvijica u Londonu 1915. godine”, Vranjski glasnik, VII 
(1971), doc. 23, Cvijić to Pašić, 9 June 1915, conf. no. 628, 318-319; Trgovčević, “Politička 
delatnost Jovana Cvijića u Londonu 1915. godine”, 391–392. 
34 AJ, 80-2-10, Bošković to Pašić, 19 May 1915, no. 546. The Minister also suspected the 
British Minister in Niš, Sir Charles des Graz, of not relaying accurately either Pašić’s or the 
Foreign Office’s messages regarding Macedonia, toning down the former and amplifying the 
latter, in order to score a personal success by roping Pašić into accepting the Entente Powers’ 
demands (AS, MID-PO, 1915, f. XI, d. VIII, Bošković to Pašić, 22 May 1915, conf. no. 562).  
35 Ibid. Bošković’s opinion was in full agreement with that of Cvijić expressed in his telegram 
to Pašić (AJ, 80-2-10, 16 May 1915, no. 540). On that occasion, Cvijić provided a rather 
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In March and April 1915, the negotiations between Rome and the Entente 
Powers about Italy’s entry into war were intensified in London. For all their 
secrecy, the Serbian government learned from several sources, including from 
Supilo who was then lobbying in St. Petersburg, that the allies were willing to 
agree to Italy’s having not just Istria and Gorizia, but also a large part of Dalmatia 
in an attempt to step up Italian military intervention. Since Pašić believed that 
Italy could at most receive Trieste, Trentino and a half of Istria with the port of 
Pula and the Croat émigrés envisioned the Italian border as far north as along 
the Isonzo (Soča) river, it is not difficult to understand the horrific impression 
made by the extent of Italian ambitions.36 Pašić reacted with resolve. After the 
Russian Foreign Ministry had rebuffed his intention to visit St. Petersburg to 
defend the Yugoslav cause, the Serbian government sent a note to their allies 
on 6 April with the request that “the Yugoslav provinces not be made an object 
of transactions between them and Italy at the expense of the Serbs, Croats and 
Slovenes and the peace of Europe.”37 The attitude of the British government was 
not encouraging either, as Bošković was given to understand that considerable 
concessions would have to be made to Italy. The Permanent Under-Secretary in 
the Foreign Office, Sir Arthur Nicolson, stated to him on behalf of Grey himself 
“that as a minimum of gains, Herzegovina and a wide stretch of Dalmatian coast 
will be secured for Serbia.” Bošković did not respond to Nicolson’s statement, 
which effectively ignored the Yugoslav programme of the Serbian government, 
and insisted on the significance of a favourable arrangement of the northern 
borders with Hungary and Romania. However, Pašić had no intention to 
abandon a Yugoslav unification. “What did [Nicolson] say about Bosnia? ‒ And 
what did [he] say [about] Croatia, Slovenia? ‒ And what about the Banat and 
striking description of what all his attempts to present the Serbian view of the Macedonian 
problem to influential Britons amounted to: “After having admitted and accepted a well-
known series of our reasons for the importance of the [river] Vardar communication for 
Serbia, for the inconvenience of letting Bulgaria drive a wedge between ourselves and 
Greece and making contact with Albania and Italy, and after some have even allowed for 
the possibility that the Macedonians are not Bulgarians, contrary to a deep-rooted opinion 
here, almost all of them still conclude that they rely on the judiciousness and conciliatoriness 
of our Government inasmuch they will find a way to satisfy the Bulgarians with [the town 
of ] Bitolj for the sake of a future Balkan concord and because they need the Bulgarians for 
[waging war against] Turkey.” It was exactly this British reliance on the conciliatoriness of the 
Pašić government that motivated both Bošković and Cvijić to make their case to convince the 
Serbian Prime Minister in the necessity for being inflexible. 
36 Šepić, "Iz korespondencije Frana Supila", Trumbić to Supilo, Rome, 5. I. 1915, 342-347; 
Dragovan Šepić, “Srpska vlada, Jugoslavenski odbor i pitanje kompromisne granice s Italijom”, 
Jugoslovenski istorijski časopis 3 (1964), 37-40. 
37 Šepić, “Srpska vlada i počeci Jugoslavenskog odbora”, 29. 
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Bačka? ‒ If he did not say explicitly, did he think of those parts as well?” Pašić 
asked for further information.38
 In the circumstances when the greatest danger to the Yugoslav lands 
came from Italy, the moving of the émigrés out of Rome and that country was 
imperative. They left for Paris where the Yugoslav Committee was formally 
constituted on 30 April 1915 with Trumbić as its president ‒ from that moment 
onwards he was a central figure in the work of Yugoslav irredentists.39 Through 
the agency of Vesnić the émigrés went to see Delcassé the next day and handed 
him a memorandum on the aspirations of the Yugoslav people to form a single 
state. On 9 May, the Yugoslav Committee arrived in London which would 
become its headquarters for the rest of the war. London had long been envisioned 
as a centre for irredentist action by both Pašić and the émigrés ‒ the Croats 
among the latter had their special reasons as they thought that Britain’s capital 
would offer them best possibilities to safeguard their particular interests.40 In 
this, as will be seen, they would be proven right. But the main impetus to move 
to London was the fact that the fate of Dalmatia and other Yugoslav lands was 
then being decided there. There were also other reasons: 
1) it was predicted that Great Britain would have the most significant role in 
the war and at a peace conference; 2) our action was in large part based on the 
response our movement met with among [our] émigrés in the United States 
of America, with whom it was easiest to correspond from London; 3) the 
chances were that we would have most freedom to act in London, eventually 
even against the aspirations of the Italian government; 4) our great friends and 
renowned experts on the situation of Austria-Hungary, W. Steed and Seton-
Watson, were there; 5) professor [Tomáš Garrigue] Masaryk [the leader of the 
Czech national movement] decided to move his seat from Geneva to London.41 
Of these reasons, the role of the “English friends” of Serbia, as they were 
regularly referred to in Serbian diplomatic correspondence, should be specially 
noted. Along with Seton-Watson and Steed, it was the famous archaeologist, 
Sir Arthur John Evans, familiar with Balkan affairs since the 1875 uprising in 
Herzegovina ‒ he had written a popular account of his personal experience of 
the area42 ‒ and George Macaulay Trevelyan, another distinguished historian, 
38 AJ, 80-2-10, Bošković to Pašić, 22 April 1915, no. 455, and Pašić’s note on the back, 23 
April 1915. 
39 Hinko Hinković, Iz velikog doba: moj rad i moji doživljaji za vrijeme svjetskog rata (Zagreb: 
Komisionalna naklada Ćirilo-Metodske nakladne knjižare, 1927), 150. 
40 Stojanović, Jugoslovenski odbor, 11; Šepić, “Supilo u emigraciji”, 62–63. 
41 Stojanović, Jugoslovenski odbor, 14: also see discussion in Ekmečić, Ratni ciljevi Srbije, 
345–347.  
42 Arthur Evans, Through Bosnia and the Herzegovina on Foot during the Insurrection, August 
and September 1875: with an historical review of Bosnia and a glimpse at the Croats, Slavonians, 
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who mattered most. It was not a coincidence that these four prominent Britons, 
together with Cvijić, comprised “a committee for working in the English public 
opinion” which was supposed to “ask of the more eminent English politicians and 
writers who are regarded as being favourable to Serbia to present their views on 
the Yugoslav question and make them public.”43 These people had also played a 
major part in the founding and promotion of the Serbian Relief Fund which had 
been providing much humanitarian aid to Serbia after September 1914. They 
and a group of their supporters became distinct in the British public sphere 
as champions of the nationality principle, which meant that they advocated 
the break-up of Austria-Hungary and the right to freedom for the oppressed 
peoples under the Habsburgs, an objective alien to the British government until 
the last year of the war.
The moving spirit of their campaign, especially in the press, was Seton-
Watson (also known by his pen name Scotus Viator) whose views on the 
nationality question in Austria-Hungary, Yugoslav unification and his personal 
commitment have been a matter of much discussion in historiography.44 His 
attitude had evolved over time. At first he had been an advocate of the need 
to reform the Habsburg Empire in a liberal spirit, considering it an important 
and useful factor in European order. As he had grown disappointed with the 
methods of rule over the politically subdued Slavs and Romanians, especially on 
the part of Hungarian aristocracy, Seton-Watson had come to favour a trialist 
rearrangement of Austria-Hungary in which the South Slavs would have formed 
a third constitutional unit, along with Austria and Hungary, of a confederation.45 
On the basis of information that had reached him, Seton-Watson had pinned 
his hopes for transformation of the Habsburg Monarchy on the personality of 
and the Ancient Republic of Ragusa (London: Longmans, Green, and Co, 1876). 
43 Lainovic, “Misija Jovana Cvijica u Londonu 1915. godine”, doc. 3, Bošković to Pašić, 26 
February 1915, 305. 
44 Hugh and Christopher Seton-Watson, The Making of a New Europe; Gábor Bátonyi, 
Britain and Central Europe, 1918–1933 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999); James Evans, Great 
Britain and the Creation of Yugoslavia: Negotiating Balkan National Identity (London and 
New York: Tauris Academic Studies, 2008); May, “Seton-Watson and the Treaty of London”, 
42–47; Arthur J. May, “R. W. Seton-Watson and British Anti-Hapsburg Sentiment”, The 
American Slavic and East European Review 20/1 (Feb., 1961), 40–54; Hugh Seton-Watson, 
“Robert William Seton-Watson i jugoslavensko pitanje”, Časopis za suvremenu povijest 2/2 
(1970), 75–97; Nicholas J. Miller, “R. W. Seton-Watson and Serbia during the Reemergence 
of Yugoslavism, 1903–1914”, Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism XV/1-2 (1988), 59–
69; László Péter, “R. W. Seton-Watson’s Changing Views on the National Question of the 
Habsburg Monarchy and the European Balance of Power”, The Slavonic and East European 
Review 82/3 ( July 2004), 655–679.  
45 R. W. Seton-Watson, The Southern Slav Question and the Hapsburg Monarchy (New York: 
Howard Fertig, 1911).
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Franz Ferdinand. As for Serbia, he had shared the wide-spread prejudices in 
Britain arising out of the disrepute in which that country had fallen following 
the brutal murder of the last Obrenović monarch and his wife in 1903. The 
animosity to corruption and wickedness of the Serbian regime, if not the entire 
society, served to reinforce his propensity for settling the Yugoslav matter within 
the framework of the Habsburg Monarchy. It was only after the outbreak of 
war and Vienna’s definite siding with Germany that Seton-Watson embraced 
the notion of Austria-Hungary’s demise and the creation of a large Yugoslav 
state, including Serbia and Montenegro. In a memorandum addressed to the 
Foreign Office on 1 October 1914, he put on record his vision of such a country 
which would be “a federal union” under the Serbian king and consist of the 
Triune Kingdom Croatia-Slavonia-Dalmatia, a nominal virtually non-existent 
autonomous unit within Austria-Hungary, and Serbia with which Montenegro 
would be merged, each unit having its own parliament. A common parliament 
would hold its sessions in alternating cities, or in Sarajevo as a permanent capital 
of a prospective Yugoslavia. This transfer of political centre from Belgrade to 
Sarajevo was designed to reflect the Yugoslav as opposed to Serbian character of a 
new state, a point which Seton-Watson stressed throughout his memorandum.46 
As far as the Slovenes were concerned, they were supposed to be incorporated 
in the Triune Kingdom rather than allowed to preserve their own political and 
cultural individuality. With this in view, it is clear that Seton-Watson envisaged 
a would-be Yugoslavia arranged in constitutional terms as something of a dualist 
Austria-Hungary on the ruins of which it was intended to emerge.
No wonder then that his vision tallied with that of a large number of 
Croat politicians whose frame of mind was grounded in the ideology of the 
nationalist Croatian Party of Right and who believed that all the Yugoslav lands 
of the Habsburg Monarchy could and should centre on Croatia. This resulted in 
the fusion of their ideas. It was no coincidence that the words of Croat émigrés 
often reflected Seton-Watson’s conceptions,47 the only real difference being that 
Scotus Viator could speak his mind openly, whereas they were constrained, to 
certain degree, out of regard for the position of the Serbian government. This 
sort of relationship between them also meant that the Croat émigrés were 
encouraged to show more determination and persistence in their dealing with 
46 R. W. Seton-Watson i Jugoslaveni: Korespodencija, 1906–1941, ed. Ljubo Boban et al., 2 
vols (Zagreb, London: Sveučilište u Zagrebu – Institut za hrvatsku povijest i Britanska 
akademija), I (1906–1918), doc. 109, R. W. Seton-Watson to Foreign Office, 1. X 1914, 180–
186. A year later, at the moment when Serbia was under immense pressure from her allies to 
cede to Bulgaria part of her own territory, Seton-Watson underlined to Regent Alexander the 
necessity for Serbia to protect the constitutional rights and traditions of the Triune Kingdom 
and to refuse categorically any breach of its territorial integrity (doc. 151, Seton-Watson to 
Regent Alexander, 17. IX 1915, 237–240).  
47 This interplay is noted in Ekmečić, Ratni ciljevi Srbiije, 356–367. 
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the Serbian Minister, and even the Pašić government. It is indeed difficult to 
overstate the extent of Seton-Watson’s support for the Croat as opposed to the 
Serb view of a Yugoslav unification. A few instances are particularly revealing 
in this respect. In late 1914, en route to Niš, Seton-Watson and Trevelyan met 
with Trumbić in Rome. The former spent almost a whole day discussing the 
Yugoslav and Macedonian affairs with the Croat politician. “Since he is our great 
friend”, Trumbić wrote to Supilo, “I told him outright our fears regarding an 
eventual Serbian particularism, which he duly noted as necessary [for him] to 
sound out in Niš and he will inform me of it on his way back.”48 Scotus Viator 
did as he had promised and reassured Trumbić as to the political mood in Serbia 
during their next meeting. As he was going to report in the Foreign Office on 
his journey to Serbia and the Balkans, Seton-Watson asked Trumbić if there 
was any message on his part he could pass on to Grey. The Croat émigré availed 
himself of this opportunity and let him know of the plans for the formation 
of an émigré committee in London. As for a Yugoslav unification, Trumbić 
explained that it was envisaged “with the aim of preventing the cession of our 
lands, now part of Austria-Hungary, to Italy, on the one side, and to Serbia 
and Montenegro, on the other […] I recommended him, as a very important 
matter, which he understood and accepted to do so, to deliver this [message] 
to Grey.”49 As can be seen, Seton-Watson’s views and actions may have easily 
been those of another Croat émigré. In political terms, notwithstanding his 
admirable humanitarian work for the Serbian people and the army, he was 
a friend of Croatia, not of Serbia. Against this backdrop, it is not that much 
surprising to see Seton-Watson in the spring of 1915, when the negotiations 
with the Italians involving extensive territorial concessions in Dalmatia were 
coming to the fore, dissatisfied with Bošković, of which more will be said later, 
consider “quite definitely working for an independent Croatia.”50 Given that 
this consideration was part of a memorandum Seton-Watson prepared for a 
conference with Yugoslav leaders, one can only guess what passed between them 
and what the depth of their intimate collaboration was.
Although the assistance that British public figures extended to the 
Yugoslav Committee is part of any narrative about the Yugoslav question during 
the war, it is clear from the above analysis that its full extent and impact on 
the Yugoslav émigrés, and their relations with the Serbian government, have 
not been fully appreciated. Seton-Watson and Steed were convinced that the 
Yugoslav representatives, above all Trumbić and Supilo, were making a serious 
mistake because they were not present in London while the secret talks between 
Italy and the allies were underway. They believed that the Committee’s, and 
48 Šepić, “Iz korespodencije Frana Supila”, Trumbić to Supilo, Rome, 24. XII. 1914, 283–286. 
49 Šepić, “Trumbićev ‘Dnevnik’”, Rome, 9. II. 1915, 186–189. 
50 May, “Seton-Watson and the Treaty of London”, 43, note 10. 
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especially Supilo’s, contact with the Foreign Office and the press, in which the 
two of them would provide substantial support, could have made a difference 
and prevented the extortionist territorial concessions to Italy on the eastern 
Adriatic coast.51 Seton-Watson’s and Steed’s assumption was certainly much 
exaggerated as the decision of the Entente Powers was dictated by urgent 
political and military requirements which left little room for ethnographic, 
moral or any other considerations. The “English friends” urged Trumbić to arrive 
immediately, but he was with the Serbian government in Niš, while Supilo was 
staying in St. Petersburg, operating under misapprehension that Russia rather 
than France and Britain bore the greatest responsibility for conceding to Italy 
so much and that it was there that he must exert all his powers of persuasion. It 
was a testament to their persistence that they “sent them [Yugoslav émigrés] an 
urgent wire every day for a week, on the plea that it was vital that they should 
publish their manifesto before the fait accompli of Italy‘s entry [into war]”.52 In 
addition, the British friends also appealed to the “Yugoslavs” through Cvijić and 
Bošković to make an appearance in London and throw their weight in the scales. 
Their suggestion was to have Bošković introduce the Committee to Grey and the 
Serbian Minister was in agreement.53 He also found that the moment was ripe 
for a decisive action and himself proposed to Pašić that a Yugoslav manifest be 
published ‒ the Prime Minister agreed.54 Just like distinguished Britons, Pašić 
thought that the time had come for the émigrés to base their activities in Britain: 
“The Yugoslav Committee should have its seat in London, and as necessary its 
people in Paris, Rome, St. Petersburg, America, also in Geneva.” Its task would 
be to prepare an organisation of all Yugoslavs for the purpose of unification, 
since Pašić gauged that the realisation of a union after the successful war would 
51 Henry Wickham Steed, Through Thirty Years, 1892–1922: A Personal Narrative, 2 
vols (London: William Heinemann, 1924), II, 54; the introduction in Seton-Watson i 
Jugoslaveni: Korespodencija, I, 23–24; Hugh and Cristopher Seton-Watson, The Making of 
a New Europe, 131. 
52 May, “Seton-Watson and the Treaty of London”, 44. 
53 AJ, 80-2-10, Cvijić to Pašić, 23 April 1915, no. 462; 80-11-50, Bošković to Paris Legation, 
no date, conf. no. 449; Lainovic, “Misija Jovana Cvijica u Londonu 1915. godine”, doc. 10, 
Cvijić to Pašić, 21 April 1915, 309. Vesnić sent a message to the London Legation on 23 
April (no. 675), presumably for Seton-Watson, “that Trumbić and the others cannot leave 
tomorrow because of an unexpected hindrance.” In reply to this delay, Cvijić relayed what 
nearly amounted to an ultimatum: “The English friends say that if Trumbić and the others do 
not arrive tomorrow evening, it is then too late and they will not be bothered about them any 
longer.” Vesnić explained that the reason for their delay was a refusal of the British consulate 
to grant them visas (Cvijić to Paris Legation, 23 April 1915, conf. no. 464 and Vesnić to Cvijić, 
25 April 1915, no. 686).  
54 AJ, 80-2-10, Bošković to Pašić, 8 April 1915, no. 405, and Pašić’s note on the back, 9 April 
1915.  
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“depend mostly on the people in Croatia and Slovenia.”55 Besides, Bošković 
had been making practical preparations for the arrival of an émigré committee 
for some time. Expecting that around ten people would come to London from 
Rome, he had informed the Foreign Ministry that there was some office space 
in the Legation for their meetings and other activities, but he had asked for 
financial means to buy furniture and cover other expenses in the ever more pricy 
London. Pašić replied that the committee would have their own accommodation 
for which all the expenses would be met.56 The Serbian government, therefore, 
also did their part to have the émigrés relocated to Britain, but the latter seem to 
have been more roused to action by their British friends.
Once it had arrived in London, the Yugoslav Committee found itself 
under Seton-Watson’s and Steed’s instant and even more intensive pressure to 
make its political programme public. They had urged both Cvijić and Bošković in 
mid-April to telegraph Supilo and ask him to draw up a programme which they 
would publish immediately.57 Convinced in the infallibility of his judgement to 
remain in Russia, Supilo had not replied to their request and Seton-Watson 
had then turned to Hinko Hinković twelve days prior to the émigrés’ moving 
to London, sending him a draft memorandum for further elaboration or to be 
forwarded to Supilo and Trumbić. Moreover, Seton-Watson had proposed a 
list of leading personalities to sign the Yugoslav programme, including Trumbić 
and Supilo.58 Clearly, it was Supilo’s unresponsiveness that made Scotus Viator 
increasingly take matters into his own hands. The strong initiative from Seton-
Watson was also apparent from the fact that his draft memorandum included the 
statement that a future Yugoslavia would be a federation. However, that was left 
out from the final text as Vasiljević, a Serb from Bosnia-Herzegovina, must have 
opposed it – Stojanović would have also opposed it, but he was not in London 
– and the Croats must have had enough political acumen to appreciate that the 
time was not opportune for discussing such a delicate issue. The opposition of 
the two Herzegovinian Serbs had already prevented Trumbić from including 
the request for a plebiscite in the Yugoslav lands of Austria-Hungary in a 
55 Šepić, “Srpska vlada i počeci Jugoslavenskog odbora”, 34; Vojislav Vučković, “Iz odnosa 
Srbije i Jugoslovenskog odbora”, Istorijski časopis XII-XIII (1961–1962), 356.  
56 AJ, 80-8-41, Bošković to MID, 1/14 February 1915, without number; Pašić to Bošković, 
2 February 1915, no. 1177. A little later Bošković consulted Pašić about whether he should 
rent furnished or unfurnished premises for the émigrés given the price difference and the 
possibility that the purchased furniture might remain later for the use in his Legation (10/23 
March 1915, without number).  
57 Seton-Watson i Jugoslaveni: Korespodencija, I, doc. 129, R. W. Seton-Watson to Jovan Cvijić, 
[London], 15. IV 1915, 211; AJ, 80-11-51, Bošković to St. Petersburg Legation, 4 April 1915, 
conf. no. 389. 
58 Seton-Watson i Jugoslaveni: Korespodencija, I, doc. 133, R. W. Seton-Watson to Hinko 
Hinković, [London], 28. IV 1915, 215–216; doc. 137, a draft memorandum, 222.  
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memorandum prepared for and delivered to the French Foreign Ministry and 
the Russian Embassy in Paris on 10 May 1915 (not to be confused with the 
memorandum given to Delcassé nine days earlier).59 Stojanović and Vasiljević 
could not possibly agree to proposals which ignored the reality that the Entente 
Powers had promised Serbia some territories, the largest of which was their own 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, or laid down the internal constitutional arrangement of a 
would-be country without consulting the Serbian government. This certainly 
helped avoid difficulties with the Serbian Minister, since Bošković pointed out 
to Pašić ‒ and it is safe to assume that the latter was in full agreement ‒ that “the 
question of relations between the Serbs and Croats as our common internal affair 
should not now be touched upon or placed before the public and the powers”.60 
Nevertheless, Seton-Watson realised his main intention and the “Appeal to the 
British Nation and Parliament”, in the writing of which he and Steed had taken 
part no less than the Yugoslav émigrés themselves, was published in the Times 
and other newspapers as early as 13 May.61 Ironically, all their efforts were in 
vain, as the London Treaty with Italy had been signed on 26 April. The Serbian 
government was not informed of that development either. It was only a day 
later that Bošković managed to find out from a private source “that France took 
initiative to make these concessions to Italy […] and that England accepted the 
matter and helped make Russia, which had long resisted, go along.”62
While Pašić apparently hoped that the Yugoslav Committee would 
provide considerable assistance to the Serbian government to see the Yugoslav 
programme through, Bošković proved to have been much more sceptical. This 
probably stemmed from the fact that just two days before the arrival of the 
émigrés in London he had a conversation with Grey, as well as with the Russian 
and French Ambassadors, from which he gathered that the allies were prone to 
accept the proposition of an independent Croatia and that Italy was particularly 
insistent on such a scheme in order to keep the Croats separated from the Serbs 
and facilitate its entrenchment in the eastern Adriatic.63 Moreover, Bošković 
came into conflict with the leading Croat émigrés from the very beginning of 
their stay in Britain. Dispute between them and the Serbian Minister arose out 
59 Stojanović, Jugoslovenski odbor, 15; Nikola Stojanović, Mladost jednog pokoljenja (uspomene 
1880–1920) i Dnevnik od godine 1914. do 1918., ed. Mile Stanić (Belgrade: Istorijski institut, 
2015), 263. 
60 Dragovan Šepić, Italija, saveznici i jugoslavensko pitanje, 1914–1918 (Zagreb: Školska knjiga, 
1970), 94; Stanković, Nikola Pašić i jugoslovensko pitanje, II, 128–129. 
61 “The Southern Slavs: Aims of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes”, The Manchester Guardian, 
13 May 1915, p. 8. 
62 AJ, 80-8-41, Bošković’s note, 2 May 1915 (new style), on the back of Pašić to London 
Legation, 14 April 1915, no. 4269.  
63 AJ, 80-2-10, Bošković to Pašić, 29 April 1915, no. 488.  
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of the publication of the above mentioned manifest of the Yugoslav Committee. 
Bošković explained this affair to Pašić as follows:
Before publication that text was not shown to me and they showed it to Cvijić 
yesterday at noon after they all had signed it. I found that the manifest did not 
take sufficient account of the role and importance of Serbia in the work for 
unification of the Croats and Slovenes with the Serbs and that it practically 
sacrificed the state idea of Serbia around which the South Slavs should 
gather together. As it might happen that Grey will not receive the committee 
without my request and perhaps my personal presence at the audience, and I 
cannot agree to the committee’s advancing such ideas in my presence, as that 
would mean that the Serbian government are also in agreement, I need your 
instructions and your orders as to what attitude I should take. I think that the 
committee should present to us beforehand not just the text of the memoir 
[prepared] for Grey, but also all that they want to say to Grey during the 
audience and that we should approve of it. Otherwise the matter can turn out 
to be inconvenient and unpleasant to Serbia. I can tell you that Croat ideas and 
tendencies have already emerged from the committee, and the English friends 
are pushing it in that direction. It would be better if the committee could 
complete its business here as soon as possible without the participation of the 
Serbian Minister and leave as soon as possible.64 
Cvijić advised Prime Minister in a similar vein and Pašić decided that 
the émigrés would have to be in agreement with Bošković about things to be 
said to Grey, if the Minister was going to present them to the British Foreign 
Secretary.65 But he neither commented on Bošković’s dissatisfaction with the 
Croat émigrés’ attitude nor Cvijić’s reservations on account of their insistence on 
using the name Yugoslavia for a future country, though the Serbian government 
made no decision in that respect. He appears to have been inclined to agree with 
Cvijić’s opinion that the existing difficulties emerged because the Yugoslav spirit 
had still not matured and that patience and circumspection on the Serbian side 
would contribute to harmonisation, especially once a common state had become 
a reality. 
As soon as the Yugoslav manifest affair had been settled, Bošković 
became suspicious of Trumbić’s and Hinković’s second thoughts about whether 
they should be received by Grey in his presence, just like Vesnić had taken them 
to Delcassé in Paris. “I cannot comprehend their attitude and they leave me 
with the impression that they want to work on their own, while the Legation is 
supposed to accept everything and be solidary with their work with the English 
64 AJ, 80-2-10, Bošković to Pašić, 30 Apil 1915, no. 494; Janković, Srbija i jugoslovensko pitanje, 
496–497. 
65 AJ, 80-2-10, Cvijić to Pašić, 30 April 1015, no. 495, and Pašić’s note on the back, 2 May 
1915; Šepić, Italija, saveznici i jugoslavensko pitanje, 97–98; Janković, Srbija i jugoslovensko 
pitanje, 497–498.  
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government”, he complained to Pašić.66 After having returned from Paris, where 
they had been given opportunity to speak before the members of parliamentary 
commission for foreign affairs, the émigrés were willing to be introduced to Grey 
and hand him a memorandum on the Yugoslav question, a copy of what they 
had earlier given to Delcassé. In fact, the Foreign Office had promised Seton-
Watson on 7 May that Grey would receive the representatives of the Yugoslav 
Committee on the same terms as the French Foreign Minister ‒ that meant that 
the Serbian Minister had to be present.67
The drafting of a memorandum led, however, to wrangle between 
Bošković and the Croat émigrés which reflected their different conceptions 
of a Yugoslav unification and, especially, the role Serbia was going to play in 
that process. Bošković raised objections to the memorandum prepared by the 
Yugoslav Committee concerning the usage of the name Yugoslavia and the 
treatment of Dalmatia. As has been seen, attention had already been drawn 
to the fact that the Serbian government had not approved the Yugoslav label 
for a prospective country. However, resistance to the name Yugoslavia among 
many Serbs cannot be understood without appreciating that, in their view, that 
name had been associated with the alleged Austrian conception of a Yugoslav 
unification within the Habsburg Monarchy restructured on the trialist basis.68 
This practically meant that Yugoslav unification within Austria-Hungary would 
have been completed against Belgrade’s ambitions and goals and that even the Serb 
population in the Habsburg lands would have remained permanently separated 
from Serbia. For that reason, a large number of Serbs, and Radicals in particular, 
were not sympathetic to that name, seeing in it, as Pašić’s deputy, Stojan Protić, 
explained during the 1917 conference between the Serbian government and the 
members of the Yugoslav Committee in Corfu, an Austrian product which had 
been “directed against the Serbian name”.69 Contrary to the Serbs, the Croats 
favoured the name Yugoslavia because it underscored that a new state would not 
have an exclusive, or even predominant, Serbian character. In this respect, the 
clash between Bošković and the émigrés with regard to Meštrović’s exhibition 
held in the Victoria and Albert Museum in June 1915 was revealing. According 
66 AJ, 80-2-10, Bošković to Pašić, 7 May 1915, no. 516.  
67 Hugh and Cristopher Seton-Watson, The Making of a New Europe, 132. 
68 Mirjana Gross, “Hrvatska politika velikoaustrijskog kruga oko prijestolonasljednika 
Franje Ferdinanda”, Časopis za suvremenu povijest 2/2 (1970), 9–74; John Zametica, Folly 
and Malice: The Habsburg Empire, the Balkans and the Start of World War One (London: 
Shepheard-Walwyn, 2017), 71–96. 
69 Krfska konferencija (Belgrade: Štamparija “Skerlić”, 1934), 82, 84. Pavle Popović later 
confirmed that the Serbs had been in general opposed to the name Yugoslavia and that he 
had also expressed such opinion to the members of the Yugoslav Committee (“Memorandum 
Jugoslovenskog odbora i poslanik Srbije”, Srpski književni glasnik XXI/1 (1927), 426–434).  
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to Meštrović’s and Seton-Watson’s recollections, the Minister shunned the 
opening of the exhibition after Meštrović had declined to present himself as 
a Serbian instead of a Serbo-Croatian, i.e. a Yugoslav, artist.70 Bošković denied 
that this had been a true reason for his absence and alluded to the improper 
attitude of the Croat émigrés towards a prominent Briton with whom he had 
agreed to act as a patron of the exhibition.71 But given his views on the Yugoslav 
name there is no doubt that this was, at least, one of the contributory factors 
of his dissatisfaction. However, Vesnić wanted to be present because the event 
provided an opportunity for a public display of Serbian-British friendship; he 
proposed to Jovanović‒Pižon he should go as a friend of Meštrović rather than in 
an official capacity out of regard for Bošković’s position. Jovanović‒Pižon agreed 
with his suggestion, probably after having consulted Pašić, and instructed Vesnić 
to go to London together with Jovan Žujović.72 Vesnić’s presence at the opening 
of the exhibition certainly helped to mitigate the impression made by Bošković’s 
absence, although neither Vesnić nor the Serbian Foreign Ministry were familiar 
with what was going on between the Minister in London and Meštrović, or could 
have anticipated that the former would not make an appearance at the event.
The second issue Bošković took with the memorandum concerned the 
stress it laid on a union between Dalmatia and Croatia (and Slavonia) on the 
basis of the Croatian state right. As he pointed out to Pašić, he endeavoured “not 
to have some Croatia’s special and exclusive rights on Dalmatia emphasised, as 
it emerged from the committee’s first draft. For if it occurs that Croatia must be 
organised as an autonomous [i.e. independent] state or province, then Serbia 
should preserve her rights on Dalmatia so that it cannot be said that we have 
admitted Croatia’s claim by accepting such wording of the memoir and mediating 
for its submission to the English government.”73 Bošković later described his 
stance in an informal conversation as a struggle against an attempt on the part of 
the Croats from the Yugoslav Committee to “outline the borders of Croatia with 
70 Ivan Meštrović, Uspomene na političke ljude i događaje (Zagreb: Matica hrvatska, 1969), 
52–53; R. W. Seton-Watson, “Kako je postala Jugoslavija ( Jugoslovenski odbor i Srbijanska 
Vlada u Londonu, za vreme Rata)”, Nova Evropa XV/1, 11 January 1927, 6–18.  
71 Mateja Bošković, “Jugoslovenski odbor i Srbijanska vlada”, Politika, 13 May 1927, p. 2. 
72 AJ, 80-2-9, Vesnić to Jovan Jovanović, Paris, 18/31 May 1915 and Jovanović’s note on the 
back, 1 June 1915. Nevertheless, Bošković supported Meštrović’s idea to exhibit his works 
in Russia in 1916, which he deemed an effective form of national propaganda (AJ, 80-11-
51, Bošković to Miroslav Spalajković (St. Petersburg), 15/21 December 1915, conf. no. 
1254). The Serbian government dropped the idea because of considerable expenses involved 
and the difficulties of transporting Meštrović’s pieces (Dragoslav Janković, “O odnosima 
Jugoslovenskog odbora sa srpskom vladom u 1916. godini”, Historijski zbornik 29-30 (1976-
1977), 455, note 2).  
73 AJ, 80-8-41, Bošković to Pašić, 19 June 1915, conf. no. 653; Janković, Srbija i jugoslovensko 
pitanje, 499. 
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Dalmatia, Istria and Bosnia”.74 Dispute between him and the Croat émigrés, 
especially Trumbić, took a long time, was bitter and overcome mostly due to 
Pavle Popović’s mediation.75 The other Serbs in London had much tactfulness 
and patience, making allowance for the mentality of the Habsburg subjects, but 
they were essentially in agreement with Bošković, though they appear not to 
have shared his doubts about the “separatism” of the Croat émigrés. Speaking 
for the Serbs of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Stojanović and Vasiljević supported the 
Serbian Minister’s standpoint.76 Finally, Trumbić realised that power relations 
were such as to make it impossible for him and other Croats to impose their 
views on the diplomatic representative of Serbia. After having inquired of Pavle 
Popović whether Bošković was acting under instructions from Niš and having 
been replied that he was not aware that this was the case, Trumbić concluded, 
not entirely reassured, that they would do as required.77 
With the agreed text of the memorandum, it was not before 2 July 1915 
that Bošković took eight members of the Yugoslav Committee to the Foreign 
Office where Lord Crewe received them instead of the indisposed Grey. It was 
only after this audience – during which Lord Crewe significantly warned the 
Yugoslavs that no nation had ever fulfilled all its aspirations and never would 
– that the Minister reported to Pašić on the differences which had emerged 
between himself and the émigrés, sent him both versions of the memorandum 
(that initially proposed by the Yugoslav Committee and the final one submitted 
to the Foreign Office) and expressed his expectation that his conduct would be 
approved.78 Clearly, Pašić had not been aware of the conflict between Bošković 
and the émigrés while it had been going on prior to the audience with Lord 
Crewe. Once he had been apprised of what had transpired, the Prime Minister 
neither minuted nor replied to Bošković’s report. The latter was consequently 
justified to take this as a tacit approval of his handling of the affair. The rift 
between Bošković and the Croat members of the Yugoslav Committee, though it 
had been settled, remained in the mind of both parties, as well as Seton-Watson, 
a serious incident which brought into relief the differences in their conceptions 
of Yugoslav unification and foreshadowed the conflicts to come. Some years after 
the war it was still central to an altercation between Bošković and Seton-Watson 
74 Jovan Žujović, Dnevnik, 2 vols (Belgrade: Arhiv Srbija, 1986), II, 30 August / 12 September 
1915, 183. 
75 Popović, Iz dnevnika, 31 May 1915, 180; 1 June 1915, 181; 2 June 1915, 182.  
76 Stojanović, Dnevnik od godine 1914. do 1918, 265–266; Popović, Iz dnevnika, 10 June 1915, 185.  
77 Popović, Iz dnevnika, 1 June 1915, 181–182. 
78 AJ, 80-8-41, Bošković to Pašić, 19 June 1915, conf. no. 653. It should be noted that 
Bošković later claimed that the members of the Yugoslav Committee had not published the 
memorandum handed to Grey and that they had distributed the older one instead, clearly a 
version he had objected to (Žujović, Dnevnik, II, 7/20 September 1915, 187). 
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arising from their different interpretations of the past events in the pages of the 
Zagreb and Belgrade press.79
As the summer of 1915 went by and military situation was increasingly 
deteriorating for the Entente Powers with the success of the German army 
against the Russians in Poland, the failure of the British on the Dardanelles and 
a stalemate on the Italian front, Serbia was exposed to the growing pressure to 
make territorial sacrifices in Macedonia and the Banat. Facing the unanimous 
demands of his allies, Pašić was forced to back down; he strove to extract as 
many concessions as possible in return for what Serbia would have to yield in 
Macedonia. Replying to the allied offer of 16 August which promised Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Srem, Bačka and part of southern Dalmatia, perhaps Slavonia if 
possible at the end of the war, Pašić accepted on 1 September to give way in 
Macedonia, notwithstanding certain modifications in delimitation with Bulgaria, 
on condition that the allies agreed to assigning the western Banat and Croatia 
to Serbia and allowing the Slovenes to decide for themselves in the matter of 
unification with Serbia.80 In effect, Pašić requested the Entente guarantee of a 
Yugoslav unification for concessions to be given in Macedonia. Bošković was, 
on the other hand, much more concerned with maintaining Serbian territory in 
the south than securing a Yugoslav union, despite his observance of the Prime 
Minister’s instructions. He did not just doggedly defend the territorial integrity 
of Serbia in his conversations with Grey and other Foreign Office officials, 
only reluctantly consenting to minimal concessions to Bulgaria (between the 
Bregalnica and Vardar rivers), but also tried to impress his determination on 
Pašić. Speaking of the suggestions that Bulgaria should be given territory across 
the Vardar, he reminded the Prime Minister that he “has always been against it 
and I do not see what great benefits for Serbia would have to be on the other 
side to make me depart from my conviction.”81 Bošković assessed that Grey 
would not resort to the utmost pressure or give concessions to Sofia without the 
consent of Serbia, of which he suspected the French and Russian governments, 
and he was hopeful that Serbia might stand her ground. Nevertheless, the allies 
seemed to make endless combinations at the expense of his country and the 
Minister came to fear “that the massacre of the Serbian people’s interests will be 
complete”.82 Once Bulgarian military action against Serbia had become certain, 
the only hope to avert disaster lay either in the urgent arrival of Anglo-French 
79 Janković, Srbija i jugoslovensko pitanje, 500–501.  
80 Ibid. 127–130; Šepić, Italija, saveznici i jugoslavensko pitanje, 125–129, 137–140, 143–144; 
Andrej Mitrović, Srbija u Prvom svetskom ratu (Belgrade: Srpska književna zadruga, 1984), 
245-246. 
81 AJ, 80-8-41, Bošković to Pašić, 3 June 1915, conf. no. 711; 80-2-10, Bošković to Pašić, 10 
July 1915, no 731; Bošković to Pašić, 17 July 1915, no. 752 [quoted]. 
82 AJ, 80-8-41, Bošković to Pašić, 1 August 1915, conf. no. 794. 
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troops or a preventive Serbian attack to thwart mobilisation of the Bulgarian 
army. Bošković’s conversation with Lord Kitchener, War Secretary, laid bare 
the extent of self-deception of the allies which would soon cost Serbia dearly. 
Indicating that Serbia was about to receive a large-scale assistance from her allies 
and that Greece would assume a benevolent attitude and allow the transit of 
the allied troops through its territory, Kitchener believed that Bulgaria might 
reconsider her military engagement and was against a preventive Serbian attack 
as it could step up a German and Austro-Hungarian offensive before the arrival 
of Anglo-French troops. Fearful that Serbia would still be requested to make 
concessions to Bulgaria, Bošković expressed his personal opinion to Pašić that 
such a development, as well as allowing Bulgarian troops to enter Macedonia, 
would be disastrous for the morale of Serbian soldiers, whereas Bulgaria would 
remain an enemy just the same and mark her time until the beginning of an 
offensive from the north. “The Powers cannot give us sufficient guarantee that 
the demise and material destruction of Serbia would not be brought about 
in this way, since it must be clear in advance how the Bulgarian and German 
troops would treat the people in Serbia. Even if our allies win [the war] later, 
the Serbian people will not reap much benefit as Serbia will be devastated”, he 
warned.83
The tension in relations between the London Legation and Supilo 
carried on. When the latter had informed him about his conversation with Grey 
on 30 August 1915, and especially about Foreign Secretary’s interest in Croatia 
and Slavonia, Bošković drew attention of Pašić, not for the first time, to the 
likelihood that this exchange arose from the idea of creating an independent 
Croatia. In the context of the ongoing negotiations about compensations that 
Serbia should receive for her ceding territory in Macedonia, the Minister 
explained the significance of that matter as follows:
If the idea of a Croatia prevails, there will certainly be a danger that Slavonia 
gets lost for Serbia, which would be a great pity for future Serbo-Croat 
relations in case it turns out that complete political unification cannot be 
realised as a result of this war. In my opinion, the unconditional acquiring of 
Slavonia for Serbia is a question of capital importance on which no transactions 
should be made, if a favourable further development of Serbo-Croat relations 
is to be secured. Therefore, I find that under no circumstances the idea should 
be accepted that Slavonia could freely decide, along with Croatia, if it wants 
[to unite] with Serbia or not. A request should be clearly made, among the 
conditions for our concessions to Bulgaria, that Slavonia have to go to Serbia 
unconditionally. Of course, this [should be the case] unless the whole of Croatia 
is required to unite with Serbia unconditionally rather than granting Croats the 
right to self-determination. This should not be agreed to in case of Slavonia: it 
[that province] needs to be attached to Serbia directly, and not through Croatia. 
83 AS, MID-PO, 1915, f. XI, d. VIII, Bošković to Pašić, 18 September 1915, no. 955. 
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If Dalmatia has not been consulted, what would be the need of doing so with 
Slavonia. If we do not pay attention to this question while there is time, we 
can easily have the same bitter experience we have suffered with Dalmatia and 
which awaits us with the Banat.84 
Bošković’s analysis did not just concern the need to secure the possession of 
Slavonia if an independent Croatia was created instead of Yugoslavia. He also 
considered that a mere diplomatic acknowledgement of Slavonia as a preserve of 
Serbia, together with other territories which could become a matter of dispute 
between the Serbs and Croats, would practically force the latter to opt for a 
common South Slav state. “For if Croatia gets Dalmatia, Slavonia and north-
west Bosnia, then she is dangerous. And if we get Bosnia and part of Dalmatia 
and part of Slavonia, then we are a point of gravity for Croatia and they have to 
go with us.”85 This was the meaning of the Minister’s reference to the necessity 
of ensuring “a favourable further development of Serbo-Croat relations”. 
Bošković was particularly alarmed by the fact that proposal for a 
plebiscite to decide the fate of Bosnia-Herzegovina, southern Dalmatia, 
Slavonia and Croatia after the war had been mooted during the conversation 
between Supilo and the British Foreign Secretary. He was convinced “that such 
combinations, which open the possibility to dispute Serbia’s right not just to 
Croatia, Dalmatia and Slavonia with Srem, but even to the Balkan peninsula 
[i. e. Bosnia-Herzegovina, a geographically inaccurate reference], could have 
occurred to neither Grey nor others.” Bošković reminded Pašić that Grey had 
never discussed with him anything else apart from admitting to Serbia “the right 
to Bosnia and a wide stretch of the Dalmatian coast.” “If that had not been the 
case”, he wondered rather rhetorically, “how could have Serbia considered to cede 
even the smallest part of her present territory to Bulgaria. The idea suggested to 
the Foreign Office about attaching all the western Serb lands to the narrower 
Croatia [meaning the Banska Croatia as an autonomous unit within Hungary] is 
full of dangers for Serbia’s interests.”86 The Minister was no doubt correct in his 
assessment of the origins of the plebiscite idea as the record of the conversation in 
the Foreign Office shows that it was Supilo who suggested it to Grey.87 Bošković 
84 AJ, 80-2-10, Bošković to Pašić, 19 August 1915, no. 847. 
85 Popović, Iz dnevnika, 29 July 1916, 507–509. 
86 AJ, 80-2-10, Bošković to Pašić, 21 August 1915, br. 582. 
87 Hugh and Cristopher Seton-Watson, The Making of a New Europe, 139; Šepić, Italija, 
saveznici i jugoslavensko pitanje, 141–142. Moreover, Supilo stated to Grey in line with 
the old nationalist Croat view to which he subscribed that all the provinces in question 
were “inhabited by Croats” (quoted from the Foreign Office record in Šepić’s book). For 
Britain’s policy towards the Yugoslav unification, see Dragoljub Živojinović, “Velika Srbija 
ili Jugoslavija? Velika Britanija i jugoslovensko ujedinjenje 1914–1918. godine”, in Stvaranje 
jugoslovenske države 1918: zbornik radova i diskusija (Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju 
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was also correct with regard to the ominous nature of the proposal, because it 
concerned only those territories that could be contested between the Serbs and 
Croats, leaving aside northern Dalmatia, Istria and the Slovene lands claimed 
by Italy, on the one side, and Bačka and the Banat on Serbia’s northern border, 
on the other. Aware of the weakness of his position, Supilo admitted to Pašić 
the deficiencies of “Grey’s formula”, but still recommended that it be accepted on 
the grounds that it would set the precedent for other Yugoslav territories.88 In 
fact, following the Treaty of London and after having got wind of the Entente 
Powers’ offer to Serbia of considerable compensations in the Austro-Hungarian 
territory for concessions in Macedonia, Supilo feared that the Croatian lands 
would be divided between Italy, Serbia and, possibly, Hungary.89 His suggestion 
to Grey was made for the sole purpose of thwarting the assigning of the 
Habsburg territories to Serbia, which would make the creation of Yugoslavia, 
and even of an independent Croatia, an unlikely proposition. 
Having been informed of the matter from both Bošković and the British 
Minister in Niš, Pašić was resolute in his adherence to the Yugoslav programme. 
The Prime Minister insisted on unification of Croatia with Serbia. If the allies 
did not accept such a solution because of Italy’s opposition, he found that the 
right course of action was to work to ensure that “Croatia does not hesitate, but 
to make a decision [in favour of Yugoslavia] when the question of unification 
with Serbia is posed. Only if we work in this way, we can count on unification 
of all the Yugoslav lands.” Pašić refused to consider any alternative policy certain 
that Italy stood behind all other combinations, “because we would open the 
door to all kinds of agitations and intrigues, and turn a safe basis [of our policy] 
into an uncertain business, the outcome of which we cannot predict.”90 This 
was also a rebuff to the plebiscite suggestion as conceived by Supilo. Discussion 
in the Yugoslav Committee that followed reflected a wide array of opinions on 
both Supilo’s undertaking and Pašić’s reply. Having been kept in the dark about 
Supilo’s dealings with the Foreign Office and regarding them as going too far, 
Trumbić agreed with Pašić’s views and geared the Yugoslav Committee towards 
supporting the Serbian government. It concluded that it was unnecessary in 
principle to have recourse to a plebiscite, but, if Great Powers were bent on 
& Narodna knjiga, 1983), 153–171; Victor Rothwell, “British Policy on the South Slav 
Question during World War I”, in Jugoslovensko-britanski odnosi: Saopštenja sa okruglog stola, 
održanog 23–25. septembra 1987. godine u Kragujevcu, povodom 150 godina od dolaska prvog 
britanskog konzula u Srbiju (Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 1988), 167–190. 
88 Šepić, Pisma i memorandumi Frana Supila, doc. 67, Supilo Pašiću and doc. 68, Supilo 
Pašiću, London, 1. IX. 1915, 103-105. 
89 Dragovan Šepić, “Hrvatska u koncepcijama Frana Supila o ujedinjenju”, Forum: časopis 
odjela za suvremenu književnost JAZU VII/XV/2–3 (1968), 358–359. 
90 AJ, 80-2-10, Pašić to Bošković, 22 August 1915, conf. no. 9126. 
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it, demanded that a plebiscite be held not just in Croatia, but also in all other 
Yugoslav lands of Austria-Hungary.91 Supilo insisted on this modification of the 
plebiscite suggestion with a view to linking the future of Croatia with the rest of 
Yugoslav territories.
Pašić’s attitude left no doubt that he would not depart from the decisions 
made by the Serbian government after the outbreak of war despite major 
difficulties Serbia faced in the summer of 1915, reflecting the unfavourable 
developments for the Entente Powers on the battlefields. Neither the conclusion 
of the Treaty of London with Italy nor negotiations of the Entente Powers with 
Bulgaria and Romania in which the interests, and even the territory, of Serbia 
served as a bargaining chip deterred Pašić from his Yugoslav policy. His stance 
was clearly different from that of Bošković, who was far from Pašić’s resolve in 
the matter of Yugoslav unification. Although Bošković was not against a Yugoslav 
union as Serbia’s maximal war aim, that was certainly not an indispensable 
programme in his view. The Minister believed that the vital interests of Serbia 
concerned the maintenance of Macedonia, or at least the right bank of the 
Vardar river, as part of the existing state territory and the acquisition of a large 
part of the Banat including the towns of Vršac and Timișoara (Temišvar). As 
for the western provinces, he believed, just like all other Serbian statesmen and 
diplomats, that annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina was a foregone conclusion 
and hoped for as wide an outlet to sea as possible in Dalmatia and perhaps on 
the Albanian coast.
A comparison between the views of Pašić and Bošković is especially 
interesting for the purpose of throwing additional light on the perennial dilemma 
in historiography as to what Pašić was really after during the Great War. It has 
been long argued that the Serbian Prime Minister kept two irons in the fire: 
he balanced between two complementary political programmes, the “large” and 
the “small” one, the former being a Yugoslav unification and the latter, a reserve 
option in case the creation of Yugoslavia proved unattainable, a Serb unification, 
meaning annexation to Serbia of all ethnically undisputable Serb lands and 
those which were regarded as Serb with more or less justification. Other authors 
have, on the contrary, emphasised the persistence and permanence of Pašić’s 
championing of the Yugoslav programme.92 A careful examination of Pašić’s 
91 AJ, 80-2-10, Bošković to Pašić, 27 August 1915, without number; Stojanović, Dnevnik 
od godine 1914. do 1918, 272-275; Janković, Srbija i jugoslovensko pitanje, 217–220, 510–512; 
Šepić, Italija, saveznici i jugoslavensko pitanje, 142–143. 
92 For the accounts which endorse the duality of the “large” and “small” programme see: 
Paulova, Jugoslavenski odbor u Londonu; Jovan M. Jovanović, Stvaranje zajedničke države Srba, 
Hrvata i Slovenaca, 3 vols (Belgrade: Štamparija “Mlada Srbija”, 1930), III, 82; Šepić, “Srpska 
vlada i počeci Jugoslavenskog odbora”, 9, 39; Šepić, Italija, saveznici i jugoslavensko pitanje, 102, 
105; Ivo Petrinović, Ante Trumbić, politička shvaćanja i djelovanje, 2nd ed. (Split: Književni 
krug, 1991); Ivo Goldstein, “Resistance to Centralism”, in Yugoslavia from a Historical 
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instructions and minutes, on the one hand, and Bošković’s reports in which he 
disclosed his personal opinions, on the other, shows that the “small” programme 
interpretation could be applied to the musings and recommendations of the 
latter. There were also other prominent and influential Serbs who were prone to 
this kind of reasoning given the complexities of diplomatic and military situation. 
For example, Cvijić was personally favourable to the Yugoslav programme of 
the Serbian government and he spared no effort to contribute to its realisation 
through his activities in London whether in contact with British public figures and 
government officials or in his dealing with the Yugoslav émigrés. Nevertheless, 
he advised Pašić that Serbia must be, in case of necessity, prepared for a different 
outcome: “If Croatia turns out to be detached [independent], then it is necessary 
to start working to secure the less extensive [border]line with Srem and part 
of Slavonia, along with other areas.”93 This preparedness was in line with the 
tenor of Bošković’s recommendations to Pašić. But the Serbian Minister never 
received a reply from Pašić, for even a year later he did not know “whether our 
government have worked to get part of Slavonia in case of a separate Croatia.”94 
From that, but also from every single undertaking of Serbian diplomacy, it is 
clear that Pašić took a different view: he unconditionally stood for unification of 
all the Yugoslav lands of Austria-Hungary with Serbia.
Pašić remained true to an integral Yugoslav union even after the downfall 
of Serbia in the autumn of 1915 and the retreat of the Serbian army, government 
and crown through Albania to the island of Corfu. His conversation with Pavle 
Popović in April 1916 was indicative in this respect. Having been told that the 
Serbs in London had “worked for Serbia since the invasion” – as opposed to 
working for a Yugoslav union – the Prime Minister succinctly replied: “That is 
one and the same, it should not be separated”.95 It is exactly in this sense of 
not differentiating between a Serb and Yugoslav unification that one should 
understand Pašić’s well-known usage of the terms Serb and Yugoslav, as well 
as some others (Serbo-Croat, Serbo-Croat-Slovene), as synonymous rather 
Perspective (Belgrade: Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia, 2017), 128. On 
Pašić’s Yugoslav orientation see: Dragoslav Janković, “‘Veliki’ i ‘mali’ ratni program Nikole 
Pašića (1914–1918)”, Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu XXI/2 (1973), 151–167; Ekmečić, 
Ratni ciljevi Srbije, 435–445; Alex Dragnich, Serbia, Nikola Pašić and Yugoslavia (New 
Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1974), 129–130; Stanković, Nikola Pašić i jugoslovensko 
pitanje, II, (Belgrade: BIGZ, 1985); Djordje Stanković, Srbija i stvaranje Jugoslavije (Belgrade: 
Službeni glasnik, 2009), 77–97; Djordje Radenković, Pašić i Jugoslavija (Belgrade: Službeni 
list, 1999). 
93 Lainovic, “Misija Jovana Cvijica u Londonu 1915. godine”, doc. 16, Cvijić to Pašić, 5 May 
1915, 312–313. 
94 Popović, Iz dnevnika, 29 July 1916, 507–509. 
95 Ibid. 4 April 1916, 414. 
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than reflecting certain confusion of these terms in his mind, as it has also 
been interpreted.96 Besides, throughout 1916 relations between the Serbian 
government and the Yugoslav Committee were good in general, as they were 
based on the pursuance of the Yugoslav programme, despite differences which 
emerged in some matters such as recruitment of volunteers for the Serbian 
army, relations with Italy and the vision of a future common country.97 In the 
summer of 1917, Serbia’s support for Yugoslav unification was made manifest to 
all and sundry when Pašić and the leaders of the Yugoslav Committee signed the 
Corfu declaration, which laid down the principles on which Yugoslavia would 
be founded.98 
It was not before early 1918 that there were any signs that Pašić was 
willing to prepare the ground for the possibility that a Yugoslav state would 
not come into being. At that point, the British Prime Minister, David Lloyd 
George, and the American President, Woodrow Wilson (on 5 and 8 January 
respectively) publically suggested the possibility of the conclusion of a separate 
peace with Vienna and made it clear that the oppressed peoples of the Habsburg 
Monarchy would have to settle for an autonomous status within that country. 
Such prospect meant that the creation of a Yugoslavia would remain a pipe 
dream. In the circumstances, Pašić wanted to secure formal abolition of the 
annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina to Austria-Hungary and the possession, 
at least, of that province for Serbia. After all, that was an understandable and 
rational political move: Pašić simply tried to secure Serbian interests as best as 
he could in the deteriorating international situation. It should be noted that 
his instructions to Ljubomir Mihailović, earlier Charge d’Affairs in Rome and 
now Minister in Washington, reflecting his concern for Bosnia-Herzegovina 
met with the latter’s categorical rejection on the grounds that those denoted the 
abandonment of the Yugoslav programme.99 On the other hand, the members 
of the Yugoslav Committee felt in the wake of Lloyd George’s and Wilson’s 
statements that they had nothing to lose any longer; consequently, they took an 
uncompromising attitude. The “Yugoslavs” started to pressurise Pašić and the 
Serbian government – and Regent Alexander – to maintain the full solidarity 
96 Janković, Srbija i jugoslovensko pitanje, 529; Mitrović, Srbija u Prvom svetskom ratu, 164–
169. On confusion, see Stanković, Nikola Pašić i jugoslovensko pitanje, I, 186. 
97 Janković, “O odnosima Jugoslovenskog odbora sa srpskom vladom u 1916. godini”, 
455–468. 
98 Dragoslav Janković, Jugoslovensko pitanje i Krfska deklaracija 1917. godine (Belgrade: 
Savremena administracija, 1967). 
99 Gradja o stvaranju jugoslovenske države (1. I–20.XII 1918), 2 vols, ed. Dragoslav Janković 
and Bogdan Krizman (Belgrade: Institut društvenih nauka, 1964), I, doc. 30, N. Pašić to Lj. 
Mihailović, Salonica, 22. I [1918], 44–45; doc. 34, Lj. Mihailović to N. Pašić, Washington, 23. 
I [1918], 48–49. 
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with their stance and, moreover, to fuse the Serbian parliament into something 
of a new representative body of the entire Yugoslav people.100 Naturally, Pašić 
could not consent to abolishing the key elements of Serbia’s statehood such as 
the parliament in the midst of war for the sake of manifesting fidelity to the 
Yugoslav idea, especially not at the moment when the Entente Powers seemed 
to have excluded it. Since detailed treatment of this troubled affair is out of 
scope of this study, it is important to note here that Pašić showed willingness 
to depart from the ideal of a Yugoslav unification towards the more narrowly 
defined Serbian national programme only at the juncture in which international 
situation forced his hand in the late phase of the war. With another change in 
the political situation after the spring of 1918, when the allies decided to wage 
war until the defeat of the Central Powers and to dismantle Austria-Hungary 
to that end, he reverted to the earlier Yugoslav policy – the creation of a large 
Yugoslav state. Therefore, there is no evidence to support the view that Pašić 
vacillated between the “large” and the “small” programme since the outbreak of 
the war.
Pašić’s persistence in carrying out the policy on which he set his heart is 
perhaps best visible in his treatment of the reports on Supilo which he received 
from the Serbian Minister in London. Bošković’s profound distrust of the Croat 
émigrés which evolved into his firm conviction that they were disloyal to the 
common cause seem to have been confirmed during a tête-à-tête he had with 
Supilo. The latter turned up in the Legation and said: “Serbia is abandoning 
Croatia, does not request her unification [with Serbia]. If that is the case, he 
as a Croat must demand a strong Croatia, the present-day one with Dalmatia 
and Bosnia, because without that no conditions for survival exist. The Catholic 
Bosnians have authorised him for his work. He is convinced that the Muslims will 
side with them. Mr Bošković told him to write about that to Mr Pašić as soon as 
possible; and he (Bošković) has telegraphed to him [Pašić] about that today.”101 
A striking feature of this conversation was that Supilo did not just defend the 
territorial integrity of the Triune Kingdom, which was a unanimous stance of 
almost all the Croat émigrés, but also made claim to Bosnia-Herzegovina in 
which the Serbs constituted nearly a half of the population. Supilo seems to 
have never written to Pašić what he had said to Bošković, but the Minister did 
100 Ibid., I, doc. 11, A. Trumbić to Crown Prince Alexander, N. Pašić and A. Nikolić, 
London, 10. I [1918], 22–23; doc. 23, A. Trumbić to Crown Prince Alexander, London, 15. 
I [1918], 35; doc. 27, N. Pašić to Yugoslav Committee, Corfu, 17. I [1918], 41–42; doc. 29, 
Yugoslav Committee to Crown Prince Alexander, the Serbian Government and A. Nikolić, 
London, 21. I [1918], 43–44; doc. 32, A. Trumbić to Crown Prince Alexander, London, 22. I 
[1918], 46–47; doc. 50, N. Pašić to Yugoslav Committee, Corfu, 30. I [1918], 62–64; doc. 65, 
A Trumbić to N. Pašić, London, 5. II [1918], 82–84. 
101 Žujović, Dnevnik, II, 3/16 September 1915, 184. 
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send his report to Niš. “I have a clear impression that Supilo and the likes of 
him are working to tie Slavonia and Dalmatia with part of Bosnia with the fate 
of Croatia”, Bošković was adamant.102 In his view, there was no doubt that the 
Yugoslav programme of the Serbian government in reality developed into the 
struggle between the Serb and Croat aspirations reflected in the clash over the 
possession of Dalmatia and Slavonia, and even part of Bosnia. After receiving 
such a report, Pašić had to take some measures to counteract Supilo’s agitation. 
He reacted by requesting Žujović, Velimirović, Pavle Popović and Stojanović 
to mediate and ensure harmony in the work of the Yugoslav Committee and 
in its relations with the Legation, “taking care that persons with Supilo’s idea 
remain isolated.”103 This was in keeping with Pašić’s pragmatic policy to have the 
Yugoslav emigration demand unification with Serbia in principle and leave all 
other potentially divisive questions aside to be dealt with after the war.
But no account of the conflict between Bošković and the Croat members 
of the Yugoslav Committee, especially Supilo, is complete without considering 
the role played by Seton-Watson and other British friends. Seton-Watson’s 
absolute support for the Croat émigrés was even more pronounced due to his 
animosity, and even outright hostility, towards Bošković. In his correspondence 
and conversations held with the Serbian personages in London, Scotus Viator 
insisted that Serbia was poorly represented by her present Minister. Both he and 
Steed claimed that the British friends of Serbia found it impossible to work with 
Bošković, just like the members of the Yugoslav Committee, that the Foreign 
Office took a dim view of him, that the Minister himself did nothing on his 
own initiative and did not even bother to get up before the afternoon.104 It is 
indeed difficult to tell whether the slandering of the Serbian Minister originated 
with the Croats from the Committee and was suggested to the distinguished 
Britons, or the former just used to repeat the argumentation of Seton-Watson 
and Steed while complaining to the Serbs in London.105 In particular, Seton-
102 AJ, 80-2-10, Bošković to Pašić, no. 898 [only the last page has been preserved, without 
date, but definitely 3 September 1915 on the basis of the above quote from Žujović’s diary]. 
The telegram was received in MID on 4 September 1915 and filed as strictly conf. no. 9606. 
Pašić wrote on the back: “Read it. I will reply when I get Supilo’s letter.” Bošković’s telegram 
confirmed an earlier information from the Russian Ambassador Benckendorff to the effect 
that the Croats did not want a union with Serbia and that they protested “against eventual 
dismemberment of the parts of Croat lands /that should probably mean at least Dalmatia 
and Slavonia/” (AJ, 80-2-10, Bošković to Pašić, 27 August 1915, without number).  
103 Telegram from Niš, 6 September 1915, quoted in: Žujović, Dnevnik, II, 192.  
104 Popović, Iz dnevnika, 20 May 1915, 168–171; 28 August 1915, 234; 31 August 1915, 
235–236; 5 September 1915, 240–242; Žujović, Dnevnik, II, 11/24 September 1915, 193–
196; 22 September / 5 October 1915, 200.  
105 See, for example, the complaints made by Hinko Hinković and Meštrović, the members 
of the Committee, in: Žujović, Dnevnik, II, 15/28 June 1915, 130; 7/20 September 1915, 187. 
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Watson defamed Bošković to important persons in Serbian diplomacy, such as 
Jovanović‒Pižon and Vesnić, with a view to bringing about his removal from 
London.106 Steed sent a letter to Pašić with the same arguments and for the 
same purpose.107 Both Britons pointed out Bošković’s inimical attitude towards 
Supilo and, in order to prove the injustice of such a stance, declared an absolute 
confidence of all British friends of Serbia in the Croat politician. Seton-Watson’s 
objections to the Serbian Minister were, in fact, unfounded. In his biography 
written by his own two sons, both noted historians themselves, it is admitted 
that the perusal of diplomatic material of Serbian and British provenance shows 
Bošković in a very different light ‒ he was “an intelligent observer and a competent 
diplomat.”108 With his campaign of defamation, Scotus Viator only proved that 
he was prepared to turn against people whom he thought were standing in his 
way with the same zeal and ferocity he demonstrated while fighting for what he 
believed in.
The assessments made of Bošković by other competent observers, namely 
the Serbians engaged in national propaganda in Britain, who were more familiar 
with Serbian policy and the situation in the London Legation than British 
friends, are not helpful. They were more revealing of their own views on the 
Yugoslav question and the extent to which they agreed, or not, with the Minister 
than of his handling of the matters. Those among them who shared much of his 
views and appreciation of the Croat émigrés, like the Popović brothers, and were 
also friends with him, held Bošković’s abilities in high regard.109 On the other 
side, Cvijić was, despite being a friend and, to a large degree, in agreement with 
the substance of reports Bošković sent to Pašić, more optimistic with regard to 
Yugoslav unification and thus considered, so it seems, the Minister’s opinion 
106 Seton-Watson i Jugoslaveni: Korespodencija, I, doc. 153, Seton-Watson to [ Jovan M. 
Jovanović], 20. IX 1915, 242–243 and doc. 156, Seton-Watson to Milenko Vesnić, 26. IX 
1915, 245–246. 
107 Hugh and Cristopher Seton-Watson, The Making of a New Europe, 140. 
108 Ibid. 133. Benckendorff stated in October 1915 that Bošković was well received in the 
Foreign Office because he spoke openly, although “a few months ago they were not satisfied” 
(Žujović, Dnevnik, II, 29 September / 12 October 1915, 203). Dissatisfaction mentioned 
by Benckendorff was, according to the Romanian Minister, Nikolae Mishu, caused by 
Bošković’s intransigence concerning Macedonia ( Jovan M. Jovanović Pižon, Dnevnik (1896–
1920), ed. Radoš Ljušić and Miladin Milošević (Novi Sad: Prometej, 2015), 8 October 1916, 
183–184). The Russian Ambassador told Jovanović–Pižon: “Your predecessor has been a 
little nervous, but I am favourably disposed to him.” (Ibid., 29 September 1916, 174–175) 
Bošković appreciated his French colleague Paul Cambon and Mishu, whereas he said of 
Benckendorff that “he has never anticipated anything, but he has never tried to anticipate.” 
(Ibid., 11 September 1916, 162)  
109 Popović, Iz dnevnika, 27 May 1915, 176–177; Žujović, Dnevnik, II, 4/17 September 
1915, 185; Janković, Srbija i jugoslovensko pitanje, 500–501.  
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exaggerated. Cvijić complained to Žujović “that Mr Bošković does little work and 
is interested in nothing except Macedonia”, and he had nothing good, according 
to the historian and publicist Grgur Jakšić, to report to Pašić concerning the 
Minister’s performance.110 Furthermore, Bošković’s job in London was made 
more difficult on account of indiscipline and lack of dedication of his secretaries 
in the Legation, of which Žujović warned him on three occasions.111 It was 
characteristic of relations within the Legation that the first secretary, Vojislav 
Antonijević, one of the correspondents of Seton-Watson, spoke to Žujović no 
fewer than four times against his head of mission.112
Constant complaints and intrigues against Bošković were not without 
their effect in Niš. Jovanović‒Pižon drew Bošković’s attention to the fact that 
the members of the Yugoslav Committee had complained about the lack of 
cordiality and intimacy in their reception in the London Legation in marked 
contrast to the earlier situation in the Serbian Legations in Rome and Paris. 
Pašić’s deputy suggested that the Minister should invite them more often to the 
Legation “together with the Englishmen, our friends”.113 Just two weeks later, 
Jovanović‒Pižon reiterated in a telegram written by himself and signed by Pašić 
his request to Bošković to change his attitude towards the “Yugoslavs”, but this 
time he stressed the unfavourable impression made on the British friends.114 In 
doing so, he indicated the source of his information, at least some of it. Bošković 
rejected the said “denunciations” and “petty intrigues”, explaining the probity 
and appropriateness of his conduct; he surmised that “a discreet English friend”, 
who remained unnamed, stood behind the complaints. He certainly referred to 
Seton-Watson as it could be made out from his pointing out the dissatisfaction 
because British financial contributions for the Serbian sufferers were channelled 
through the Legation instead of the Serbian Relief Fund ‒ in this matter the 
Minister reminded of the instructions he had been given by the Foreign Ministry. 
It seemed to him that the spleen which had emerged on that account was later 
vented “in the advices given to the main émigré committee.” More importantly, 
110 Žujović, Dnevnik, II, 30 June / 13 July 1915, 146–147; 6/19 July 1915, 151; Popović, Iz 
dnevnika, 5 September, 240–241.
111 Žujović, Dnevnik, II, 3/16 October 1915, 209–210; also Popović, Iz dnevnika, 2 December 
1915, 301–302. 
112 Žujović, Dnevnik, II, 8/21 October 1915, 212. Shortly before Regent Alexander’s and 
Pašić’s visit to London next year Antonijević prepared a memorandum for the purpose of 
drawing attention to the main questions which Serbia would have to face until the end of 
the war and at a peace conference. His paper did not indicate much of its author’s analytical 
skills, but it was certainly revealing of Antonijević’s great personal ambitions (AS, MID-PO, 
f. X, d. II, memorandum by Vojislav Antonijević, 21 March 1916). After the war he became 
the Minister of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in Rome. 
113 AJ, 80-2-10, Jovan Jovanović to Bošković, 28 July 1915 (dispatched next day, conf. no. 8268). 
114 AJ, 80-2-10, Jovan Jovanović to Bošković, 12 August 1915, conf. no. 8738. 
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Bošković believed that the crux of the problem was in the question “whether the 
Legation should accept and carry out everything that the committee or some of 
its members ask for without [making] its own remarks. In that case, I think that 
I cannot be held responsible.”115 Bošković’s reply to the accusations made against 
him shows that he was aware that the “English friends”, and Seton-Watson above 
all, were among the causes of his difficulties with the Croat émigrés, though he 
appears not to have fully appreciated either the extent of their unconditional 
support for Supilo and Trumbić or the depth of their intolerance to himself. His 
position in the Legation was, however, not threatened as long as Scotus Viator’s 
and Steed’s endeavours met with no response from Pašić. In November 1915, 
just at the time of major crisis on the Serbian front due to the Bulgarian attack, 
the Prime Minister declined the crude insistence from London accompanied by 
the threat that the “English friends” would deny all further support to Serbia, 
pleading with them to bear in mind the critical situation.116
Nevertheless, Bošković appears to have sensed that his handling of the 
Croat émigrés was not well received in the Foreign Ministry, particularly on the 
part of Jovanović‒Pižon, or that he was at least considered not sufficiently tactful 
and patient in his dealings with them. For that reason, he strove to smooth over 
the differences and avoid as much as he could any further clashes. When Žujović 
cautioned him to undertake energetic measures in order to impose order among 
the staff of the Legation, Bošković’s excuse for not doing so was “that all [of them] 
would join together against him and he would be guilty just like in the Yugoslav 
Committee affair.”117 The Minister went so far as trying to improve his relations 
with Supilo and show his superiors that there was no bad blood between them. 
Acting on Supilo’s complaint to Jovanović‒Pižon that two letters which had 
been sent to him through the Legation had reached him with considerable delay, 
Bošković conducted an investigation among his staff and found out that the 
former clerk, certain Vojislav Petrović, had been negligent to his duties. Bošković 
also proposed, irrespectively of that matter as he underscored, “that it would be 
nice to be attentive to Mr Supilo on this occasion and offer him a sum of 2000 
dinars [approximately 2000 French francs], all the more so as he has not wanted 
to take anything from Serbia so far, as far as I know and as he has told me.”118 
Supilo and Trumbić were indeed noted exceptions among the members of the 
Yugoslav Committee, who kept their financial independence from the Serbian 
government, not just because they had sufficient means of their own, but also 
because they were anxious to maintain an independent political position. 
115 AJ, 80-2-10, Bošković to Pašić, 16 August 1915, no. 838. For disputes concerning financial 
contributions, see Hugh and Cristopher Seton-Watson, The Making of a New Europe, 140.  
116 Hugh and Cristopher Seton-Watson, The Making of a New Europe, 153. 
117 Žujović, Dnevnik, II, 3/16 October 1915, 209–210. 
118 AS, MID, PsL, f. I, pov r 1327/1915, Bošković to MID, 22 September 1915, confidential, 
without number. 
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Bošković referred to confiscation of Supilo’s assets by the Austrian authorities 
as a reason for Niš to extend him financial assistance and show its good will.
After the “Albanian Golgotha” and the reorganisation of the Serbian 
army in Corfu, the next important task for Bošković was to prepare the ground 
for a visit which Regent Alexander intended to make to Britain as part of his 
diplomatic sojourn in all the allied capitals.119 The Regent and Pašić arrived 
in London on 31 March 1916 and over the next few days met with the British 
royalties, policy-makers and important public figures.120 Seton-Watson placed 
high hopes in the Regent as a future bearer of Yugoslav policy, since he thought 
that Pašić was unable or unwilling to be so, and handed him a memorandum in 
which his and Steed’s ideas of the principles on which a Yugoslavia should be 
founded were spelled out. On that occasion, he apparently raised all his well-
known accusations against Bošković and extracted a promise from Alexander that 
the Minister would be soon removed from London and replaced by Jovanović–
Pižon, a fervent advocate of a Yugoslav union.121 That is why Jovanović–Pižon 
could tell Pavle Popović with certainty: “Mata will fall; he is clever and intelligent, 
he has predicted [things] accurately, his reports are good, but it does not take 
more to make his position untenable than [the fact] that our sole friends ‒ Seton-
Watson ‒ are against him.”122 It is interesting to observe that Bošković himself 
had a substantially different impression of the reasons behind his dismissal once 
he had heard from Popović that it was discussed: “his report on Bulgaria, which 
is the main thing; then comes the Yugoslav Committee and Seton-Watson. It 
does not seem definite to him.”123 A reference to a report on Bulgaria concerned 
an exchange between him and Vojislav Marinković, an acting Prime Minister 
during Pašić’s absence from Corfu. Marinković inveighed against the Minister 
in London because of his failure to report on the increased activities of British 
Bulgarophiles. This was neither a fair assessment of Bošković nor particularly 
relevant given that the alleged campaign had not been substantial and presented 
119 AJ, 80-8-43, Pašić to Bošković, 21 February 1916, no. 1337 and Bošković’s note on the 
back, 22 February 1916; Bošković to Pašić, 3/16 March 1916, conf. no. 162; AS, MID-PO, 
1916, f. XI, d. VIII, Bošković to MID, 22 February 1916, no. 131; Bošković to MID, 27 
February 1916, no. 144; Bošković to MID, 4 March 1916, no. 158; f. XI, d. IX, Bošković to 
Pašić, 7 March 1916, no. 172; Bošković to Pašić, 10 March 1916, no. 183; Bošković to Pašić, 
12 March 1916, no. 187; Bošković to Paris Legation, 16 March 1916, no. 193.   
120 For the initial part of the visit, see AS, MID-PO, 1916, f. XI, d. VIII, Bošković to MID, 
20 March 1916, without number; Pašić to MID, 20 March 1916, no. 3; for more details, 
see Čedomir Antić, Neizabrana saveznica: Srbija i Velika Britanija u Prvom svetskom ratu 
(Belgrade: Zavod za udžbenike, 2012), 290–292. 
121 Hugh and Cristopher Seton-Watson, The Making of a New Europe, 156–157; Vučković, 
“Iz odnosa Srbije i Jugoslovenskog odbora”, 363–365. 
122 Popović, Iz dnevnika, 25 March 1916, 406–407. 
123 Ibid., 4 April 1916, 414–415. 
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not much of a danger to Serbia. But this affair was relatively novel, whereas the 
rift between the London Legation and the Yugoslav Committee was old news, 
and that explains why Bošković attached more importance to it than warranted 
in assessing reasons for his removal from Britain.124
Be that as it may, he was relieved of his duties on 26 August 1916 when 
Antonijević took over as Charge d’Affairs until Jovanović–Pižon replaced him as 
the new Minister on 18 September.125 Following the controversy over Supilo’s 
suggestion to Grey of a plebiscite in the Yugoslav lands of Austria-Hungary, 
the Croat politician was increasingly estranged not just from the Serbian 
government, but also from the Yugoslav Committee until he finally resigned from 
the latter in June 1916. Other Croat émigrés, most notably Trumbić, realised 
that Supilo overstepped the bounds of diplomatic realities and he was left in the 
political wilderness for the remainder of his life ‒ he died in 1917.126 Damage 
caused by Supilo’s actions and his consequent pursuit of the exclusive interests 
of Croatia was thus contained. Pašić and the Yugoslav Committee continued 
to work together for the common cause, their differences lying dormant, and, 
as has been briefly mentioned, it was not before 1918, in a profoundly different 
international environment, that their major clash emerged over diplomatic 
approach and, ultimately, the manner of a Yugoslav unification.
In the final analysis, Bošković left London as a rather distinctive 
personality in the wartime Serbian diplomacy. What sets him apart from other 
Serbian diplomats is his pronounced reservations to the Yugoslav programme, 
at least such as it was envisioned on the part of the Croat émigrés. It is small 
wonder then that the said émigrés were to a man dissatisfied with Bošković and 
complained, as one of them related to Pavle Popović, that “Mata is not like Ljuba 
Mihajlović [sic], M[ihailo]. Ristić [the new Minister in Rome], M. Vesnić.”127 
The last mentioned diplomat professed his agreement with Seton-Watson when 
the Scottish historian inveighed against his colleague in London; moreover, 
he replied that he also despaired over Bošković’s intrigues against Supilo.128 
Bošković was indeed not like other Serbian diplomats in their dealing with the 
Yugoslav Committee. It is not easy to pinpoint the reasons for his demeanour. 
In more recent historiography, it has been argued that his deportment stemmed 
from the fact that Bošković belonged to the liberal tradition which never had 
124 Forthcoming Bakić, “Mateja Mata Bošković: prilog za biografiju srpskog diplomate”. 
125 AS, MID, PsL, f. I, pov r 791/1916, Antonijević to MID, 12 October 1916 (new style). 
126 Šepić, Supilo diplomat, 156–249. 
127 Popović, Iz dnevnika, 28 May 1915, 178. 
128 Seton-Watson i Jugoslaveni: Korespodencija, I, doc. 157, Milenko Vesnić to Seton-Watson, 
29. IX 1915, 246. 
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much affection for the Yugoslav idea.129 In retrospect, Bošković dismissed 
Seton-Watson’s allegation that he had been hostile to the Yugoslav idea with the 
claim that “it could only cause a smile of astonishment with people who know 
me well and know that I have always been faithful to the thought of unification 
of the previously dismembered parts of our people by [virtue of ] both family 
tradition and personal conviction.”130 Even if allowance is made for the need 
to justify his conduct, the fact remains – and tends to support his assertion 
– that Bošković had written about “the Yugoslav cause in the Balkans” eight 
years before the Great War.131 It seems that it was his direct experience with 
the Croat émigrés and familiarisation with their political views and vision of a 
Yugoslav unification that played a decisive role in the formation of his attitude. 
This certainly accounted for his mistrust of which he reported to Pašić in no 
uncertain terms. But it is also highly likely that as a tried diplomat Bošković was 
influenced by his own appraisal at the early stage of the war that international 
circumstances were such as not to favour the formation of a Yugoslav union. 
Bošković’s pessimism in this sense was, apart from the conspicuous reservations 
of the Foreign Office, probably increased by the exchange of views with the 
Russian Ambassador Benckendorff who did not believe that Serbia could, 
in addition to Bosnia-Herzegovina, get more than part of the Dalmatian 
coast.132 But perhaps more striking than his motivation and reasoning is the 
apparent unqualified enthusiasm of other Serbian diplomats for the creation of 
a Yugoslavia. Together with Pašić’s determination in pursuing Yugoslav policy 
despite discouraging international situation, it is an exploration of this frame of 
mind that might provide more fertile field for further studying of pro-Yugoslav 
proclivities in Serbian foreign policy rather than misleading dichotomy between 
forging Greater Serbia and Yugoslavia.  
129 Miloš Ković, “Liberalizam”, in: Miloš Ković, ed., Srbi 1903–1914: istorija ideja (Belgrade: 
Clio, 2015), 192. 
130 Mateja Bošković, “Jugoslovenski odbor i Srbijanska vlada”, Politika, 13 May 1927, p. 2. 
131 Mateja S. Bošković, Stara Srbija i reforme (Belgrade: Štamparija Svetozara Nikolića, 
1906), 28. 
132 AJ, 80-2-10, Bošković to MID, 30 October 1914, without number.  
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